This article presents the dualist perception of the ‘I’ of the woman phenomenologist, Hedwig Conrad-Martius (1880–1966) as a radical attempt to respond critically to Husserl’s turn towards transcendentalism. Conrad-Martius’s peculiar view of the I (ichhaftes Sein) appears as a remarkable refutation of one of the widespread criticisms of the phenomenological realism contemporary with Edmund Husserl regarding the lack of discussion of the issue of the ego or the I. My main argument is that the dualism not only signifies the structure of the I in HCM’s philosophy but also provides the essential framework for its phenomenological deciphering, in which it transpires as a genuine philosophical problem that as such is unresolved.
This article delineates the main milestones in the trajectory to the internality of Being in CM’s thinking against the transcendental Husserlian thinking, in the face of which and out of the criticism of which her metaphysics was consolidated: it starts from uncovering the multi-aspect duality that characterizes the real being, continues in encountering the limitations and constraints that are imposed by a study anchored in the appearances of the real external world, and culminates in the articulation of the internality of Being as “self-adherence” (Selbsthaftigkeit or Selberkeit) that typifies real beings and the spiritual-I. This trajectory is not marked by CM herself, but like any phenomenological journey it is personal and can be best carried out in the first person. The author demonstrates that unlike the journey in the Husserlian transcendental phenomenology, in which the gap between the internal and the external is intensified to the point of the reduction of the external world, as a result of which the world is eliminated and sometimes even seems entirely forgotten, in CM’s phenomenology there is no such opposition and anyway the external world is not overlooked. On the contrary, in her thinking the simultaneous gaze to the internal and the external aspects of reality is preserved and the thematization of the gap between the two transpires as a useful hermeneutical tool for overcoming it. Finally, CM’s writings achieved an abundant and complex perception of the internality of Being that in no way leaves behind its external dimensions and the world in general.
The pivotal insight that paved Conrad-Martius’ (1880-1966) (CM) way in elucidating the ontological exclusivity of the I, denoted as “I-adhering being”) Ichhafte Sein(, is that despite its peculiarity and incomparability to any other mode of being, only the ontological foundations of the real being in general might enable a faithful comprehension of the I. The phenomenological interpretation suggested in this article presents CM’s ontological understanding of the I vis-a-vis her philosophy of Being, in particular in regard to three of its general characteristics – existence, intelligibility, and self-adherence (Sichheit/Selberkeit) – which provide the critical approach to the ontological study of the I. Finally, the understanding of the ontological exclusivity of the I-adhering being is achieved by means of explication of the joining together of its typical affinities and discrepancies in regard to Being in general.
Yearbook of the Irish Philosophical Society , 2014
This paper is dedicated to the elucidation of the phenomenal experience of the I that is at the foundation of the realistic phenomenology of Hedwig Conrad-Martius (hereafter: CM) (1888-1966). The discussion focuses on CM’s early book On the Ontology and Doctrine of Appearance of the Real External (1916). The author deciphers the modes of the involvement of the “I” in the appearances of the real external world and extricates from CM’s analysis of the external world two dispositions of the I: “passive self-inclusiveness” and “active consciousness”. Her argument is that they respond to the two spheres of the objects of the external world. Against the sensible (sinnfällige) object, the “I” is passive and self-including, responding to the phenomenality of objects. However, regarding covert objects, the I is active and directed beyond itself, to the concealed essence that is covered over by the phenomenal layer of things.
The New Yearbook for Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy (NYPPP), 2018
This paper proposes an analysis of Hedwig Conrad-Martius’ (1888-1966) On the Ontology and Doctrine of Appearance of the Real External World (1916) from the perspective of Husserl’s theory of whole and parts presented in the Logical Investigations. The author identifies the “whole” with “sensory-givenness” and the parts with “feeling-givenness” and “givenness of the appearance.” The main argument is that dependent-independent relations and the necessary laws that prescribe the unity of objects, at the center of Husserl’s third investigation, are also foundational in CM’s early ontology. This ontology is torn between two forces that compose an unsolvable tension: on the one hand, the search for an essential and unified whole, which is viewed as independent of the senses, consciousness and the human subject in general that will provide a grip on the problem of “reality as such.” On the other hand, while searching for access to this whole, CM encounters the involvement of the senses and consciousness in its appearances, that is, in the appearing of the external world.
Phänomenologische Forschung 2014, 59-82 , 2014
The question “what is reality?” that opens Realontologie (1923), the establishing book in Hedwig Conrad-Martius’s (CM) oeuvre, establishes her realistic metaphysics. In her opinion, the firmly established “blinding insight” in modern philosophy regarding the unfathomable contrast between the ideal and the real blocks any access to the question of reality. Her realontological philosophy seeks the “gate of reality”, meaning the datum-point where things “elevate” themselves from non-existence or mere ideal existence but do not yet arrive at “operative Being” or realistic fulfillment. CM identifies three characteristics of the real by which it is meets the “task of Being” imposed upon it to personally describe and fulfill the essence inherent in it: formationality (Leibhaftigkeit), self-standing and primordiality. The suggested interpretation of each of these three seeks to unravel the seeming contrast between the real and the ideal in favor of what she regards as the only genuine and primordial opposition that separates the real from nonexistence.
Analecta Husserliana, CXVI 2014, pp. 327-358.
“On the Ontology and Doctrine of Appearance of the Real External World” (1916) is the first publication from a vast corpus of writings by Hedwig Conrad-Martius (CM), a phenomenologist from the Munich School. The phenomenon of “the real external world” encloses within itself everything that “exists outside” (Daraußenseinde) and that is “of the external world” (Außenweltliches). The “self-presentation” that deeply characterizes the sensory givenness is an essential foundation in the phenomenon of the reality, to the extent that it distinguishes it from everything that “lacks a Being- for-itself” and thus misses what might be presented externally. Although sensory appearance is not itself the totality of the external world, CM determines that the pure observation of what the sensory appearance presents by itself and in itself, and not of what is above and beyond it, provides the “framework for the whole” of the research, since by sensory presentation “the book of the real world is being opened”. The paper proposes a critical explication of both constitutive phenomena of the sensory givenness, “feeling’s givenness” and “manifest appearance givenness”, and suggests a metaphysical interpretation that explicates them in terms of the relation between immanence and transcendence that seems to be a key to the understanding the phenomenology of reality that that unifies the entirety of CM’s writings.
The International Journal of Literary Humanities, Volume 11, Issue 3, The International Journal of Literary Humanities Vol 11 issue 3, 2014, pp. 37-48. , 2014
This article focuses on the problem of transcendence in “On the Ontology and Doctrine of Appearance of the Real External World” (1916) (Doctrine of Appearance) – the first publication from a vast corpus of writings by Hedwig Conrad-Martius (1888-1966) (CM). The principles of the realistic phenomenology that CM explores in this treatise by studying the phenomenon of the real external world, designate her early ontology upon which her later metaphysical worldview would be based. Her establishing argument associates transcendence with mundane reality and eliminates mystical meaning from it. Although the ontological aspect of the problem of transcendence is more dominant in CM’s approach, its epistemological dimensions are not denied but illuminated through her discussion of the nature of human spirit in the face of which the world appears as external. My main argument is that CM’s phenomenology of externality lays the foundations for the phenomenology of transcendence. Consequently, transcendence transpires as the depth and the most ultimate meaning not only of externality but also of reality as such.
The Review of Rabbinic Judaism
This paper confronts Edith Stein’s Christian idea of faith with the Jewish one of
Yeshayahu Leibowitz. The discussion begins by uncovering the common starting point
of the two thinkers, which anchors religious faith in one’s volitional decision. Yet this
commonality appears to be violated by essential differences between their understandings
of the religious experience. Delving into the differences between Stein’s and
Leibowitz’s idea of faith demonstrates two faces of radicalism in the human religious
STUIDIA HEBRAICA, special volume: TO BE OR NOT TO BE A JEW – ON CONVERSION TO OR RENOUNCING JUDAISM, Andrei Cornea & Măriuca Stanciu (eds.), Editura Universităţii din Bucureşti, 2015, pp. 219-251., 2014
Abstract: This paper confronts Edith Stein’s Christian idea of faith with the Jewish one of Yeshayahu
Leibowitz. The aspect of conversion as the starting point for understanding Stein’s idea of faith is rejected in
favor of a careful phenomenological reading of the relevant texts of both thinkers. The discussion starts with
uncovering their common starting point which anchors religious faith in one’s volitional decision, continues
with a manifestation of the essential differences between their understandings of the religious experience, and
culminates with a demonstration of the commonality of the aspect of radicalism.
This is the first up-to-date bibliography of Edith Stein’s work, presented by the author, Francesco Alfieri, at the Cologne Carmel on 22 April 2012. This book is dedicated to Sister Maria Amata Neyer on her 90th birthday, and its publication coincides with the 70th anniversary of Edith Stein’s death in 1942. It offers a list of all the books published in German and subsequently in other languages, based on the new edition of Edith Stein’s works (ESGA).After a short biography of Edith Stein (55–58), there is a list of Stein’s works: both the first editions of her works in German (ESW) and all the translations into other languages which are based on the German original.
An English translation of this article appeared in as chapter in the referred collection (scanned bellow):
Ronny Miron, The Desire for Metaphysics, Selected papers on Karl Jaspers by Ronny Miron, Common Ground, University of Ilinois Research park, 2014, pp. 17-50
Analecta Husserliana, vol. CV (2010), pp. 229-251, 2010
This paper suggests a phenomenological reading of Karl Jaspers’ writings regarding the issue of guilt. This reading aims to extricate from them an ontological understanding of guilt, at the centre of which stand the various appearances of guilt and not the subjective awareness of its experience. The discussed ontology of guilt does not exist in Jaspers’ thinking in its entirety, but rather is only implicitly interwoven in his ideas – some of them referring to the issue of guilt, but spread over his writings in a elementary and not systematic manner, while others, no less central to the phenomenology of guilt, are not exposed by him as referring to the idea of guilt, but according to the suggested interpretation are relevant to the ontology of guilt (for example, the idea of historicity). Although the suggested phenomenological-ontological reading contains a certain reconstruction of Jaspers’ ideas, the reconstruction itself serves only as a means for a thematic crystallization of a possible ontology of guilt based upon his thinking but not realized by him as he rejected the very idea of ontology from the outset.
Transcendence and Dissatisfaction in Jaspers’ Idea of the Self, 2005
This paper deals with the idea of the search for self, mainly in the thinking of Karl Jaspers. The discussion will focus on the very nature of this search and the power that motivates it. For this purpose, it will employ a phenomenological viewpoint that will follow Jaspers’ course from its first point of departure, in which the self appeared. As an object of observation, up to the point where the self acquired the status of the subject, i.e., appeared as a personal and existential issue. The positively achieved insights about the self and the frustrations involved in this search will be clarified systematically. The author argues that Jaspers’ search was inspired by a constant experience of dissatisfaction, which directed the self to transcend every present understanding of the self and to look for an improved one. Lastly, the search for the self will appear as leading to another search, i.e. that for Being and transcendence.