We are pleased to announce the publication of the first paper ever on the early phenomenologist Gertrud Kuznitzky, written by research fellow Daniel Neumann. The paper “Gertrud Kuznitzky and Edith Stein on (non)conceptual experience” is available open access in early view via The Southern Journal of Philosophy.

Abstract: This article considers a largely overlooked phenomeno-logical account of nonconceptual experience that turns on experience having a sense that is unique to intuition, and which can be invoked to explain how we come to view what we experience in objective terms without referring to ready-made concepts. The two early phenomenologists Edith Stein and Gertrud Kuznitzky are discussed as hav-ing elaborated two distinct, yet related, versions of this intuitive sense. My discussion identifies two common as-sumptions of both philosophers: firstly, the idea that the objective character of intuition hinges on the structure of apprehension, which is found by investigating the regular-ities of the appearance of objects; secondly, the objective character of intuition presupposes a metaphysical notion of things having a sense in themselves. Importantly, both philosophers do not take this “sense in itself” to be a di-rect part of the contents of experience, showing objectiv-ity to arise out of intuition instead.