

NEW VOICES



History of Women Philosophers and Scientists

1st New Voices Conference
Women in the History of Philosophy
organized by Clara Carus

25th-26th of February 2022

Please register at:
contact@historyofwomenphilosophers.org

Find out more:



The **New Voices** is a project at
Center for the History of Women
Philosophers and Scientists at
Paderborn University, directed
by Ruth Edith Hagengruber.

Conference organisation team:
Clara Carus, Violeta Milicevic
and Ruth Hagengruber with
the team of the Center for the
History of women Philosophers
and Scientists.



Welcome to our Conference featuring more than 70 international *New Voices* on Women in the History of Philosophy! We are very proud to have assembled such a wonderful, sizeable and powerful group of scholars presenting their work on women in the history of philosophy.

In this booklet you will find the full conference programme, a presentation of the keynote speakers, the programme for the cultural evening and abstracts of all the conference talks. The extensive programme covers women in the history of philosophy in Antiquity, the Middle Ages and Renaissance, in Early Modern and Modern Philosophy, Phenomenology, History of Feminism, Analytic Philosophy, the field of History and Politics, Eastern Philosophy and the South-American History of Philosophy.

The talks focus on many different women in the history of philosophy including: Gargi Vachaknavi, Tullia d' Aragona, Hedvig Charlotta Nordenflycht, Edith Stein, Grace A. de Laguna, Isotta Nogarola, Cassandra Fedele, **Mary Wollstonecraft**, Ingeborg Heidemann, Alice Ambrose, Gilda de Mello Souza, Marie de Gournay, Eugenia Ginsberg-Blaustein, Susan Stebbing, Nisia Floresta, Marguerite Porete, **Anne Conway**, Gerda Walther, Christine de Pisan, Germaine de Staël, Iris Murdoch, Im Yunjidang, Karoline von Günderode, **Émilie Du Châtelet**, Nataliya Kobrynska, Natalia Ilyina, Maria Gołaszewska, Jenny d'Héricourt, Janine Bouissounouse, Jane Addams, Clarice Lispector, Hannah Arendt, Jeanne Hersch, Diotima, Lucretia Marinella, Ann Margaret Sharp, Hypatia of Alexandria, Mary Astell, Julia Ward Howe, Simone de Beauvoir, and Mary Shepherd.

We are delighted to have four excellent keynote speakers: Priyanka Jha (Banaras Hindu University, India/University of Cambridge), Samantha Matherne (Harvard University), Julia Borcharding (University of Cambridge), Pedro Prikladnitzky (UNIOESTE, Brazil).

To give the online conference a cultural framework programme we have invited Paul Lodge (Mansfield College, University of Oxford, UK) and Oxford band Flights of Helios (<https://flightsofhelios.co.uk/>) to present their songs based on poems by Margaret Cavendish and Hildegard von Bingen.

As part of the evening programme we are delighted to launch the *Conversation with Diotima* video footage of *Clara Carus in Conversation with Jasper Reid (King's College London) on Anne Conway*. To join a talk please go to the programme overview and identify the Zoom Stream Number which is noted at the top of the column. Access this zoom stream number via the link provided in your New Voices Conference Welcome email. Please note all times are CET (Berlin/German time) – this may be a different time to your time zone. You can convert the times via this tool:

<https://www.timeanddate.de/zeitzonen/zeitzonenrechner?iso=20220220T140000&p1=2678&p2=13>


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Please respect an ethical way of communication and ensure all speakers and participants feel safe and happy. For any complaints please write to: contact@historyofwomenphilosophers.org.

We wish to say a big ‘thank you’ to the team at the Center for the History of Women Philosophers and Scientists for helping to make this conference possible, and a special thanks to research assistant Violeta Milicevic, and also to research assistant Dorian Weiß.

If you have missed a talk or wish to listen to it again, keep checking: <https://historyofwomenphilosophers.org/new-voices-past-talks/>

We are welcoming you and are looking forward to two exciting days with a lot of learning on women in the history of philosophy!



Conference organizer

Clara Carus



Director of the Center for the History of Women
Philosophers and Scientists
Ruth Edith Hagengruber

About New Voices

New Voices on Women in the History of Philosophy is an international group for scholars working on women in the history of philosophy and is run at the Center for the History of Women Philosophers and Scientists, Paderborn University. New Voices is free to join and open for anyone researching on or teaching women in the history of philosophy, independent of career status or affiliation. New Voices was founded in December 2020 with the intention of giving especially early career scholars, who work on women in the history of philosophy, a voice and a platform. When this aim was beginning to be achieved, and many more established scholars were interested in joining, we opened up the group to established scholars in the field while still supporting early career scholars and scholars who only recently started working on women in the history of philosophy. New Voices' main objective is to interconnect and further the work of scholars in the field of Women Philosophers in the History of Philosophy.

New Voices runs a monthly online *Talk Series* dedicated to different themes in women in the history of philosophy. The first talk series was held in the Spring Term 2021 and was titled: *Early Modern Women Philosophers on Knowledge*. The current talk series is titled *Women in History on Education*. Some of our past talks are available on our website.

All of our members have an individual *member profile* on our project website where they can present their research topic and link to their personal websites and projects.

On our project website, you will find the search tool '*Find Scholars*', which you can use to connect with scholars who work on specific women philosophers. The tool is intended for further cooperation and networking among scholars who work on women in the history of philosophy or are interested in this research.

In our *News* section you can find up-to-date information on the work of New Voices Members, such as publications, talks, events or networking projects.

New Voices runs regular round tables and we hold casual meetings at events online and in Paderborn. New Voices is a project at the *Center for the History of Women Philosophers and Scientists*, Paderborn University, which is directed by Ruth Hagenhuber, and has been co-founded and is currently organized by Clara Carus, Assistant Professor at the *Center for the History of Women Philosophers and Scientists*, Paderborn University.

If you would like further information or wish to join New Voices, please contact Clara Carus: clara.carus@uni-paderborn.de

25.02.	Zoom 2: History of Philosophy and Feminism	Zoom 3: Middle Ages/Renaissance	Zoom 4: Early Modern	Zoom 5: Modern	Zoom 6: Phenomenology	Zoom 7: 20 th Century and Analytic Philosophy
8.45- 9.00	Welcome					
9.00- 10.00	Zoom 1 Keynote: Priyanka Jha (Banaras Hindu University, India/University of Cambridge, UK): From the Self to the Universal: Exploring Women Thinking in Modern India (the 1850s-1950s) Chair: Clara Carus					
10.00- 11.00	Asha Fernando (University of Sri Jayawardenepura, Sri Lanka): Gargi Vachaknavi, A women thinker in the Vedic Period: philosophical reflections Chair: Priyanka Jha	Evina Glantzi (Greece): How the Current Philosophical Discussion on Love would be different if Tullia d' Aragona's Theory had been included in the Canon Chair: Sina Menke	Simon Wimmer (TU Dortmund, Germany): Astell on thinking matter and natural immortality Chair: Eszter Kovács	Matilda Amundsen Bergström (University of Gothenburg, Sweden): Hedvig Charlotta Nordenflycht and the Happy Life in 18th- Century Sweden Chair: Jil Muller	Michael Boch (University of Wuppertal, Germany/Vienna University, Austria): Ingeborg Heidemann as a protagonist of Post-Neokantianism Chair: Felix Grewe	Joel Katzav (University of Queensland, Australia): Grace A. de Laguna's critique of analytic philosophy Chair: Ruth Hagengruber

11.00-12.00	<p>Richa Shukla (OP Jindal Global University, India): Lost, found, or misplaced: tracing women's voices from the Hindu traditions.</p> <p>Chair: Priyanka Jha</p>	<p>Giulia Guidara (University of Pisa): Female Humanism. Gender Stereotypes and Self-perception in Isotta Nogarola and Cassandra Fedele</p> <p>Chair: Sina Menke</p>	<p>Frederik Nilsen (UiT, The Arctic University of Norway): Anne Conway and the revitalization of nature: Conway's environmental ethics as an alternative to Aristotle and Spinoza</p> <p>Chair: Eszter Kovács</p>	<p>Éva Antal (Eszterházy Károly Catholic University, Hungary): Mary Wollstonecraft's Philosophy of (Self-)Education</p> <p>Chair: Jil Muller</p>	<p>Tareq Ayoub (KU Leuven, Belgium): Dwelling in Improper Eternity: Rethinking Eschatology based on Stein's Mysticism</p> <p>Chair: Ruth Hagenruber</p>	<p>Matthew Shields (University College Dublin, Ireland): Alice Ambrose and the History of Analytic Metaphilosophy</p> <p>Chair: Richa Shukla</p>
12.00-1.00	<p>Juliana Franco (Universidade de Campinas, Brazil): Gilda de Mello Souza: Woman philosopher and art critic in the Brazil of the 20th Century</p> <p>Chair: Mitieli Seixas da Silva</p>	<p>Margaret Matthews (Villanova University, USA): Marie de Gournay's use of Skeptical Strategies</p> <p>Chair: Sina Menke</p>	<p>Manuel Fasko (University of Basel): A Powerful Metaphysics? A case for Mary Shepherd's proto-dispositionalism</p> <p>Chair: Eszter Kovács</p>	<p>Sarah Bonfim (UNICAMP, Brazil): Beyond Rights of Woman: the experience of dependence in Mary Wollstonecraft</p> <p>Chair: Jil Muller</p>	<p>Aleksandra Gomulczak (Adam Mickiewicz University, Poland): Eugenia Ginsberg-Blaustein: Husserl Scholar from the Lvov-Warsaw School</p> <p>Chair: Ruth Hagenruber</p>	<p>Lukas Skiba (University of Hamburg, Germany): Stebbing on Relations</p> <p>Chair: Evina Glantzi</p>
1.00-2.00	Break	Break	Break	Break	Break	Break

2.00-3.00	<p>Yasmim Pontes (Graduanda UFRJ, Brazil) & Nastassja Pugliese (UFRJ, Brazil): Analysing two anonymous publications on 19th century newspapers: is Nisia Floresta the author?</p> <p>Chair: Mitieli Seixas da Silva</p>	<p>Geneviève Barrette (Collège Ahuntsic, Canada): Marguerite Porete on the Annihilated Soul's Relation to the Virtues and Reason</p> <p>Chair: Evina Glantzi</p>	<p>Teresa Rodríguez (Autonomous National University, Mexico): Historiographical Pluralism and Anne Conway's Principia</p> <p>Chair: Hugo Hogenbirk</p>	<p>Alan Coffee (King's College London): Nancy Kingsbury Wollstonecraft, Social Structures and the Logic of the Logic of Non-Domination</p> <p>Chair: Jil Muller</p>	<p>Daniel Neumann (University of Klagenfurt, Austria): The social experience. Gerda Walther's psychology of community</p> <p>Chair: Luana Goulart</p>	<p>Peter West (Durham University, UK): Stebbing's Pelicans: Public Philosophy in Thinking to Some Purpose and Philosophy and the Physicists</p> <p>Chair: Manuel Fasko</p>
3.00-4.00	<p>Luana Goulart (Universidade Estadual do Ceará, Brazil): Education and Home. Political perspectives on women in the work of Mary Wollstonecraft and Nisia Floresta</p> <p>Chair: Mitieli Seixas da Silva</p>		<p>Hope Sample (Grand Valley State University, USA): Anne Conway on Divine and Creaturely Freedom</p> <p>Chair: Hugo Hogenbirk</p>	<p>Eveline Groot (EUR, Netherlands): Love of Liberty: Germaine de Staël's Sentimentalist Philosophy</p> <p>Chair: Jil Muller</p>	<p>Zoom 6: Early Modern</p>	<p>Silvia Conti (LUMSA University of Rome, Italy): Iris Murdoch and the mystical female voice</p> <p>Chair: Katharine o' Reilly</p>

4.00-5.00	<p>Mary Julius Egbai (University of Calabar, Nigeria) and Dominic Effiong Abakedi (University of Calabar, Nigeria): Girl-child trafficking and the burden of hermeneutical obstruction</p> <p>Chair: Ruth Hagengruber</p>	<p>Simona Vucu (University of Toronto, Canada): Christine de Pizan on the Moral and Epistemic Harm of Misogyny and Slander</p> <p>Chair: Evina Glantzi</p>	<p>Emanuele Costa (Vanderbilt University, USA): Transcendence and Immanence in Anne Conway</p> <p>Chair: Hugo Hogenbirk</p>	<p>Jason Yonover (John Hopkins University, USA): G�nderrode on Nature, Freedom, and Death</p> <p>Chair: Jil Muller</p>	<p>Katarina Peixoto (UERJ, Brazil): �milie Du Ch�telet’s Theory of Freedom: searching a bridge in the midst</p> <p>Chair: Ana Paula Coelho Rodrigues</p>	<p>Maria Gallego (Boston College, USA): Iris Murdoch, Imagination and the Good Life</p> <p>Chair: Katharine o’ Reilly</p>
5.00-6.00	<p style="text-align: center;">Zoom 1 Keynote: Samantha Matherne (Harvard University, USA): The Aesthetic Theory of Edith Landmann-Kalischer</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Chair: Clara Carus</p>					
7.00-8.00	<p style="text-align: center;">Zoom 1 Cultural Evening Programme:</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Songs by Paul Lodge (Mansfield College, University of Oxford, UK) and Oxford band Flights of Helios (https://flightsofhelios.co.uk/) based on poems by Margaret Cavendish and Hildegard von Bingen</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Conversation with Diotima: Clara Carus in Conversation with Jasper Reid (King’s College London) on Conway</p>					

26.02.	Zoom 2: Antiquity	Zoom 3: Early Modern/Conway	Zoom 4: Early Modern	Zoom 5: History of Feminism	Zoom 6: History and Politics	Zoom 7: 20 th Century
9.00- 10.00	<p style="text-align: center;">Zoom 1 Keynote: Julia Borcharding (Trinity College, University of Cambridge, UK): Crossing the Divide - Conway's and Cavendish's 'Spiritualization' of Matter</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Chair: Clara Carus</p>					
10.00- 11.00	<p>Ebrahim Azadegan (Sharif University of Technology, Iran): Divine Omnipotence, Sexist Political Order and Antigone's Free Action</p> <p>Chair: Caterina Pello</p>	<p>Hugo Hogenbirk (University of Groningen, Netherlands): Processual Plenitude in Anne Conway's Principles of the Most Ancient and Modern Philosophy</p> <p>Chair: Jonathan Head</p>	<p>Eszter Kovács (NKE Budapest, Hungary): The Hidden Legacy of Émilie Du Châtelet's Conception of Freedom</p> <p>Chair: Clara Carus</p>	<p>Anastasiia Babash (University of Tartu, Estonia): Women's liberation through literature and press: Nataliya Kobrynska as the first Ukrainian feminist</p> <p>Chair: Nuria Boronat</p>	<p>Tatiana Kolomeitceva (Moscow, Russia): A Dialogue Through the Century: Reception of Ernst Kunik's Historical Views in "The Expulsion of the Normans from Russian History" by Natalia Ilyina (Vokach)</p> <p>Chair: Tatiana Levina</p>	<p>Natalia Anna Michna (Jagiellonian University, Poland): Philosophy of Maria Gołaszewska (1926-2015) and Her Theory of Aesthetic Situation</p> <p>Chair: Asha Fernando</p>

11.00-12.00		<p>Anastasia Guidi Itokazu (Federal University of ABC, Brazil): An ontology for the Anthropocene? Anne Conway's vitalist conception of matter and the dancing spirits in the forest</p> <p>Chair: Jonathan Head</p>	<p>Maaïke Korpershoek (University of Groningen; Netherlands): Émilie du Châtelet's Idealism on Substance and Body</p> <p>Chair: Clara Carus</p>	<p>Annabelle Bonnet (CESPRA, EHESS-CNRS, France; UFES, Brazil): Jenny d'Héricourt (1809-1875) A forgotten precursor of feminist philosophy</p> <p>Chair: Nuria Boronat</p>	<p>Guelfo Carbone (Roma Tre University): A diary of war and persecution. Janine Bouissounouse and the Anti-Nazi Resistance</p> <p>Chair: Evina Glantzi</p>	<p>Ellie Robson (Birkbeck, University of London, UK): Taking Midgley seriously: A case for Mary Midgley's inclusion in histories of contemporary philosophy</p> <p>Chair: Julia Borcharding</p>
12.00-1.00		<p>Jonathan Head (Keele University, UK): Conway's World Soul and Monism</p> <p>Chair: Sarah Hutton</p>	<p>Mitieli Seixas da Silva (UFSM, Brazil): Analysis and mathematics in the method of the Commentary to the Du Châtelet's translation of Newton's Principia</p>	<p>Veronika Detel (University of Hamburg, Germany): Agnotology and Epistemic Oppression: Towards Methodologies of Inclusion in the History of Political Thought</p>	<p>Thijs Heijmeskamp (Erasmus School of Philosophy, Netherlands): Jane Addams and empathy as a method for democracy</p> <p>Chair: Evina Glantzi</p>	<p>Mary Peterson (University of Hamburg, Germany): Apricot Bonbons to a Free Man: Lispector and Spinoza</p> <p>Chair: Caterina Pello</p>

			Chair: Clara Carus	Chair: Nuria Boronat		
1-2	Break	Break	Break	Break	Break	Break
2.00-3.00	Zoom 2: Antiquity	Sean M. Costello (University of Michigan, USA): Anne Conway on Memory Chair: Sarah Hutton	Maja Sidzinska (University of Pennsylvania): Émilie du Châtelet's Mathematical Fictionalism Chair: Clara Carus	Sulagna Pal (University of Delhi, India): Objectification of the Environment and the Female Body Chair: Nuria Boronat	Ka-yu Hui (Boston College, USA): When violence speaks: Hannah Arendt and the narrative transformation of violence Chair: Tatiana Levina	Giulia Felappi (University of Southampton, UK): "The inverted commas have a function similar to that of the symbol "¢" of musical notation." Langer on saving logic from a metaphysical limbo Chair: Katarina Peixoto
3.00-4.00	Hilary Ilkay (University of King's College, Canada): Diotima's Renaissance: Rediscovery, Reception, Rewriting Chair: Caterina Pello	Hope Sample (Grand Valley State University, USA) & Hwa Yeong Wang (Georgetown University, USA): The Grounds of Moral Equality in Im Yunjidang and Anne Conway	Tyra Lennie (McMaster University, Canada): Marinella's Reclamation of Dress and Outward Beauty Chair: Clara Carus	Allauren Forbes (McMaster University, Canada): On Wooing Chair: Nuria Boronat	Piergiacomo Severini (Università G. d'Annunzio di Chieti-Pescara, Italy): Jeanne Hersch's philosophical turn to responsible freedom. What rights need to be human Chair: Ruth Hagenhuber	Roberto Franzini Tibaldeo (Pontificia Universidade Católica do Paraná, Brazil): Ann Margaret Sharp Chair: Anastasia Itokazu

		Chair: Sarah Hutton				
4.00-5.00	Ari Belenkiy (Vancouver BC, Canada): Astronomical Murder: The Murder of Hypatia of Alexandria Chair: Caterina Pello	Andrew Lazella (The University of Scranton, USA): What becomes of Bucephalus?: Anne Conway on The Plasticity of Nature, Ranterism, and Divine Justice Chair: Sarah Hutton	Jen Nguyen (Harvard University, USA): A True Friend Stabs You in the Front: Astell's Admonisher Conception of Friendship Chair: Clara Carus	Carol Bensick (UCLA Center for the Study of Women, USA): Julia Ward Howe: A 19th Century American Woman's Philosophical Formation in a Boston Lecture Chair: Nuria Boronat	Margaret Holda (University of Łódź, Poland): The Female Genius and the Narrative of Entrapment: Virginia Woolf's Story of Judith Shakespeare Chair: Priyanka Jha	Kayla Dold (University of Ottawa, Canada): All Men are Mortal: Novel title, ontological claim, and Simone de Beauvoir's primary philosophical premise Chair: Gisele Secco
5.00-6.00	Zoom 1 Keynote: Pedro Prikladnitzky (UNIOESTE, Brazil): The Principle of Individuation in Cavendish's Metaphysics Chair: Clara Carus					
6.00-6.15	Farewell					

Keynote Speakers

Priyanka Jha

(Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, Banaras Hindu University, India and Dr. DC Pavate Visiting Fellow, University of Cambridge, UK)



Dr Priyanka Jha is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science at Banaras Hindu University, India. Presently She is also the 20th Dr DC Pavate Visiting Fellow at Cambridge University, at the Department of Politics and International Studies and Senior fellow at Sidney Sussex, Cambridge University. Her interest lies in the area of Political theory, Political Thought and Gender Politics and Philosophy. Her most recent research interest is Gendered Intellectual History, whereby she is engaging with women thinkers from India and South Asia. She is also very keen to work on the theme of Postcolonialism, Decolonialisation of Ideas and Indian Political theory.

From the self to the Universal: Exploring Women Thinking in Modern India (the 1850s-1950s)

Women thinking as a significant conceptual variable has been parsimoniously treated in the mainstream scholarly work on socio-political philosophy and intellectual history. Admittedly, there have been efforts to resurrect this academic terrain by a collective of scholars and feminist academic spaces. It is, therefore, puzzling that despite these attempts to excavate and rescue women philosophers and thinkers, these voices are still lost in history. Scholarly landscape dealing with Indian women thinkers and philosophy is no exception. This formidable body of work is often invisible and marginalised not only at the site of its origin but in the broader ideational narratives as well. Perhaps there is a need to interrogate and problematise this gap.

As it is well-known India, has a rich historical legacy of intellectual traditions and philosophies. Indeed, women thinking and philosophy within this rich tradition is constitutive of one of the the most radical strand. In this light, this presentation seeks and explore this particular strand of women

thinking from Modern India through the works and writings of Pandita Ramabai Saraswati (1858-1922), Tarabai Shinde (1850-1910), Kamla Devi Chattopadhyay (1903-1988) and Begum Rokeya Sakhawat Hussain(1880-1932). By engaging with their key works, I provide a critical repertoire of their positions on normative themes of Religion, Equality, Labour (Reproductive as well as material) and Education. I argue this exploration provides an alternative uncharted path to map the intellectual history of ideas in Modern India.

The aim is to genealogically map and trace this particular strand of thinking and ideation, as it was one of the many rich diverse strands that Indian women thinking represent. In ways of a hermeneutical exercise, each of the above-mentioned thinkers shall be engaged with through a representative text. My engagement with these thinkers reveal themes, ideas and positions enabling us to comprehensively consolidate the mapping of the gendered intellectual history of India. I then seek to locate these thematic positions within the broader global domain of gendered normative thinking of nation and society. The aim is twin fold: firstly to introduce a rich tradition of thinking that emanated and existed in the non-European, non-transatlantic and Anglo Saxon world and secondly mapping the solidarities and conjectures that this strand of Indian thinking, shared with the rest, in ways setting a gaze on concerns that women globally struggled and engaged historically.

Samantha Matherne

(Assistant Professor, Philosophy Department, Harvard University, USA)



Samantha Matherne works primarily on Immanuel Kant, Post-Kantian traditions (especially Phenomenology and Neo-Kantianism), and Aesthetics. She is interested in the relations between perception, cognition, and aesthetics, as well as the pervasive role imagination plays in our lives. Her volume on Cassirer for the Routledge Philosophers Series is now available. She is currently exploring the neglected work of the phenomenologist, Edith Landmann-Kalischer. She is also currently at work on a systematic interpretation of Kant's theory of imagination and contributing to the *Geography of Taste: Toward a Theory of Aesthetic Diversity* (OUP) along with Dominic McIver Lopes, Mohan Matthen, and Bence Nanay.

The Aesthetic Theory of Edith Landmann-Kalischer

Though her work has been widely neglected, Edith Landmann-Kalischer (1877-1951) offered one of the first systematic programs in aesthetics in the phenomenological tradition. In this talk, I explore the heart of her aesthetic theory, which rests on three claims. The first is a realist claim that beauty is not merely in the eye of the beholder, but is rather in the world. The second is a cognitivist claim that our experience of beauty should ultimately be understood in cognitive, rather than non-cognitive terms. The third is a hedonist claim, according to which although our experience of beauty is ultimately cognitive, it is nevertheless based on feelings of pleasure and displeasure. By blending together these three realist, cognitivist, and hedonist commitments, Landmann-Kalischer defends a view of the aesthetic that represents an important, if overlooked, alternative to more familiar aesthetic approaches in the Kantian and Post-Kantian tradition.

Julia Borcharding

(Associate Professor, Department of Philosophy, University of Cambridge and Fellow of Trinity College Cambridge, UK)



I am an Associate Professor in Philosophy at the University of Cambridge. and a Fellow of Trinity College Cambridge. I specialize in early modern philosophy, with side interests that stretch into various corners of contemporary ethics, epistemology, feminism, as well as early analytic and medieval philosophy. My current research project, *The Metaphysics of Emotions*, investigates early modern philosophical discussions of love and sympathy.

Crossing the Divide - Conway's and Cavendish's 'Spiritualization' of Matter

In this talk, I show that both Conway and Cavendish contribute in important ways to the reconfiguration and enrichment of the concept of matter which took place during the 17th and 18th centuries, and which may still hold important lessons for us today. Neither Conway nor Cavendish, I argue, follow the line of division introduced by Cartesian dualism. Instead, they productively question some of its most fundamental assumptions. While on the surface, Conway may thought to be a thorough-going “immaterialist” and Cavendish a steadfast “materialist”, the striking similarities between their views point us to some deeper features of their views that in fact challenge and transcend the materialism-immaterialism divide.

Pedro Prikladnitzky

(Professor of Philosophy, Universidade Estadual do Oeste do Paraná (UNIOESTE), Brazil)



Dr Pedro Prikladnitzky is a professor of philosophy at the State University of West Paraná (UNIOESTE). Between 2016-2020, he was professor of philosophy at the State University of Maringá (UEM). He graduated from the Federal University of Rio Grande do Sul (UFRGS) where he continued his studies earning his M.A. and PhD in philosophy. He is one of the organizers of the I International Conference “Women in Modern Philosophy” in Rio de Janeiro and editors of the volume *Women in Modern Philosophy – Latin American Perspectives*. His

research focuses in early modern metaphysics and natural philosophy, particularly the perspectives of Descartes and Cavendish.

The Principle of Individuation in Cavendish’s Metaphysics

In this paper, I offer an interpretation of the principle of individuation and the ontological status of individual bodies in the work of Margaret Cavendish. By proposing an alternative to the mechanical model of natural philosophy, Cavendish must approach the metaphysics of matter from a different angle. Such a perspective can offer fruitful elements to understand the complex and diverse landscape of natural philosophy in Early Modern Philosophy. I contextualize Cavendish’s natural philosophy and its relation to the developments of other early modern approaches. After an overview of Cavendish’s natural philosophy, I present a difficulty concerning the individuation of bodies in modern philosophy in order to reveal the background in which Cavendish develops her position. An analysis of the central passages in which Cavendish explores the topic of individuation, I will try to show, exposes a problem concerning the ontological distinction between matter as a whole, the only entity that Cavendish describes properly as a substance, and the parts of matter. A realist reading of such passages would imply that nature is a substance that contains, in itself, other substantial entities as its parts, what can be inconsistent. I offer an interpretation that, for Cavendish, commonsense physical objects—what she calls bodies or parts of matter—are mind-dependent entities. They are real insofar as they are parts of the material substance. Their individuality consists in an abstraction of a whole that grounds every aspect of nature. This conclusion is supported by the occasional approach to causality developed by Cavendish. Individual bodies are not parts of matter that have

substance-like behavior or are a real substratum of properties (a subject of inherence). They are determinations of matter that can present some relative and temporary stability and unity.

Cultural Evening Program



Songs by Paul Lodge (Mansfield College, University of Oxford, UK) and Oxford band Flights of Helios (<https://flightsofhelios.co.uk/>) based on poems by Margaret Cavendish and Hildegard von Bingen

Conversation with Diotima

Launch of Interview: Clara Carus talks to Jasper Reid (King's College London) on Anne Conway



Speaker

Amundsen Bergström, Matilda (University of Gothenburg, Sweden)

Hedvig Charlotta Nordenflycht and the Happy Life in 18th-Century Sweden

In 1744, Swedish poet and enlightenment thinker Hedvig Charlotta Nordenflycht (1718–1763) publishes the poem “Important Questions to a Scholar” [Viktiga frågor till en lärd], addressed to Danish author Ludvig Holberg. In it, she asks Holberg how she is ever to become happy again, after “Newton, Leibniz, Locke, Bayle” have convinced her of the unfeasibility in her previously held belief in religion and virtue.

“Important Questions to a Scholar” marks the beginning of a philosophical engagement with the issues of happiness and the good life that is to continue throughout Nordenflycht’s twenty-year long career. Moreover, it introduces a striking rhetorical strategy: the address to male, intellectual authority. Ten years later Nordenflycht returns to the rhetorical address. In 1754, she publishes the poem “Verse-Epistle to Criton” [Skalde-bref til Criton], addressed to Swedish academic Carl Klingenberg. In this poem, she offers an account of the relationship between happiness and education that clearly, though not explicitly, builds on Rousseau’s *Discourse on the Arts and Sciences*. Seven years later still, Nordenflycht addresses Rousseau directly. But this time, he has become her ideological opponent. In the poem “The Defense of Women” [Fruentimrets Försvar], published in 1761, Nordenflycht critiques Rousseau’s views on gender and argues that in a happy and prosperous society, women must be allowed to partake in public life.

In this talk, I will discuss Nordenflycht’s views on the happy life as they are developed in the three poems to Holberg, Klingenberg and Rousseau. I will argue that through these poems, we can trace both Nordenflycht’s deepening engagement with enlightenment philosophy and her growing intellectual authority as one of few female public voices in 18th-Century Sweden.

Antal, Éva (Eszterházy Károly Catholic University, Hungary)

Mary Wollstonecraft’s Philosophy of (Self-)Education

The context of my research is provided by the philosophy of education and the problems of individual development in 18th- and 19th-century England. Female writings – both literary-utopian and educational-philosophical – seem to rely on the framework and theoretical background of well-known male works in order to present a critical and ironical reading, while they also raise questions of social solidarity and (e)quality inherent in individual *Bildung*. My research focuses on Mary

Wollstonecraft's works, primarily on her ideas of female education in reading and writing, while I also intend to present the strategies prevalent in her feminist rhetoric.

My aim is to publish a monograph and the volume will serve as a unique contribution to the scholarly literature on the author's oeuvre, as it will be the first book on Wollstonecraft's life-work published in Hungary and in Hungarian. As several chapters have already taken shape, I am planning to discuss the method, the framework and the structure of my work in my conference presentation.

I am to speak about a theoretical framework both for my study and for Wollstonecraft's works, highlighting the most influential "fathers" in the period (John Locke, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, and Edmund Burke). In the case of her early writings, I use the strategy of close reading to present the way Wollstonecraft goes beyond the conceptual training of the Lockean "gentleman" (vs. gentlewoman). In the analysis of her two novels, *Mary* and *Maria*, I will highlight the possibilities of female development (cf. *Bildung*), while two separate chapters are dedicated to Wollstonecraft's polemics with Rousseau and Burke. Recently I have just finished the chapter on the new concept of reading and *fancy* based on the analysis of the collection published under the pseudonym Mr. Cresswick, *The Female Reader* (1789), along with the interpretation of her unfinished fable titled "The Cave of Fancy" (1787).

Ayoub, Tareq (KU Leuven, Belgium)

Dwelling in Improper Eternity: Rethinking Eschatology based on Stein's Mysticism

In Roman Catholic theology, eschatology has been traditionally understood as the study of "the last things." This is specifically why no branch of theology confronts the soul's immortality as powerfully as eschatology. Thus, in rethinking traditional explanations associated with eschatology, detailing Stein's phenomenological mysticism becomes indispensable. For Stein, the life of finite beings is framed not by death in its capacity as life's inscrutable but constitutive boundary-marker, but rather by its ontological dependence on, and participation in, the infinite source of life itself. Her analyses of death and dying bring to the fore interesting metaphysical and phenomenological problems surrounding the nature of time and experience. For Stein, death opens up a new temporal dimension in that our earthly finitude is transformed to a divinely-appropriated temporality, one that lacks any sort of finite limitations. As long as our souls lack any 'dark night' – to borrow John of the Cross' spiritual term – and have been rendered clear and possible by divine light, then our deaths signify the possibility of dwelling in the divine. However, this does not mean that we share in the proper eternity of God, but that we share in His divine quality of timelessness. This timelessness places the blessed and sanctified dead in eternity while preserving their finite pasts as constitutive moments in their eternal lives with the divine. Hence, they are not divinely transformed towards eternity in death, but

dwell in an improper eternity situated in-between the time of eternity and finite temporality, forever mystified in-between the eternity of God and the temporal experience of material beings.

Azadegan, Ebrahim (Sharif University of Technology, Iran)

Divine Omnipotence, Sexist Political Order and Antigone's Free Action

Feminists' long-term critique of the traditional concept of omnipotence as a controlling and sovereign God who rules and governs the world from outside is based on their view that this conception of God legitimizes the submission of women and domination of several forms of religious violence against other world-views. According to this line of critique the belief in God's omnipotence is a belief which has served to bolster the non-egalitarian and sexist political order of our world. Two available ways out of this feminist attack on the concept of omnipotence are to accept that the alleged problems inferences from the doctrine of omnipotence are reasons for putting aside the traditional concept of God, or, to try to defend the traditional concept of omnipotence against these attacks by showing that "whatever the divine power is, it must cohere with (or, be one and the same thing as) the divine mercy, justice, and love. [Since] the bad, degenerate dependence on others such power hides cannot characterize a perfect being." The problem with the former line of thought is to deny power as one of the attributes of a perfect being and problem with the latter way is not to take the feminist experience and point of view seriously. In this paper through rereading Sophocles' *Antigone* through the lens of Judith Butler³ I shall try to define a new conception of power that comes from God's essence as love but intertwines with political order. The sexist political order is in conflict with God's law of love and kinship and so that order eventually will be diminished. However non-sexist political order can be established in harmony with God's law of love. On the hand there is also a conflict between God's law of sovereignty and non-sexist political order, while the sexist political order can find support from traditional conception of omnipotence. I shall conclude that Antigone's action is the only way to destabilize the order of society which is continue to live in a sexist order believing in a God who is sovereign ruler of the world which acts irresponsible for any of His actions. But Antigone's action can be constructive only if we have change our views toward God's attributes and laws.

Babash, Anastasiia (University of Tartu, Estonia)

Women's liberation through literature and press: Nataliya Kobrynska as the first Ukrainian feminist

My presentation will discuss the life and works of the first Ukrainian feminist writer and activist Nataliya Kobrynska (1855-1920). Particularly, I will focus on her original idea that literature and organization of the free press oriented on female audiences was the most important task for Ukrainian

women's liberation at the end of 19 century due to the specific condition in which Ukrainian women (mostly, peasants) turned out to be. Following her beliefs, Kobrynska organized the first association of Ukrainian women (called *Tovarystvo Rus'kykh Zhinok*) in 1884, the main goal of which was to “develop the female spirit through literature because literature was a comprehensive image of the good and bad sides of the social order, its needs and shortcomings¹”. She was herself a literature writer that described the women’s position in society (e.g. “*Shuminska*” (or also known as *The Spirit of the Times*), “*For a Piece of Bread*”). Together with her friend Olena Pchilka she also published the first almanac for women *Pershy vinok* (The First Garland, 1887) that was a collection of literary and political works. Later, she organized a publishing house *Zhinocha Sprava* (Women’s Cause), and edited the other three issues of a female almanac named *Nasha dolya* (Our Fate 1893, 1895, 1896). She was convinced that almanacs oriented on women will raise women’s consciousness and, thus, help them to fight their subjugated position in society. In her essays, Kobrynska also emphasized the educational rights of women, as well as the importance of developing patriotism. She believed that women should understand their origin - this helps them better fight against inequalities in their specific situation. She also argued with Clara Zetkin claiming that socialism will not automatically lead to women's liberation. Even though she supported workers' rights, she believed that women must go their own, separate way.

Barrette, Geneviève (Collège Ahuntsic, Canada)

Marguerite Porete on the Annihilated Soul’s Relation to the Virtues and Reason

Marguerite Porete was condemned as a heretic and then executed in 1310, in part because she characterized the most advanced state a soul can experience as that in which it has emancipated itself from the virtues. The annihilated soul would no longer have to practice the virtues, because its state of alignment with the divine will surpasses in its moral quality the regular exercise of the virtues. The same would, on similar grounds, be true about the annihilated soul’s relation to reason. The role that Marguerite attributes to the virtues and reason in the accession to this state nevertheless remains nebulous: obedience to the virtues and reason is presented in *The Mirror of Simple Souls* as preparatory to the state of annihilation of the soul. In her description of the progression of the soul towards annihilation, Marguerite distinguishes the moment when the soul obeyed the virtues and reason, and the moment when it is emancipated from them. However, the state of annihilation of the soul does not clearly seem to be due to this prior practice of the virtues and obedience to reason, but rather seems due to a twofold realization by the soul of its nothingness, and of the divine love for it. This paper thus aims to clarify the relation that Marguerite establishes between, on the one hand, the virtues and reason, and, on the other hand, the state of annihilation of the soul. Is there, besides a

certain chronological necessity, a metaphysical necessity between, on the one hand, the virtues and reason, and on the other hand, the annihilation of the soul? Since this idea of emancipation from the virtues by the annihilated soul is central to Marguerite's *Mirror*, clarifying this relation will shed some indispensable light on the thinker's more general views.

Belenkiy, Ari (Vancouver BC, Canada)

Astronomical Murder: The Murder of Hypatia of Alexandria

Hypatia of Alexandria, an eminent mathematician and astronomer, flourished in the late 4th and early 5th century. Though we are ignorant of how long she lived or how she looked, her personality and, above all, her martyr-like death at the hands of her compatriots came to symbolize the end of the millennium-long epoch, known as Classical Age, when Greek science made its first daring advances into the world around us.

In an earlier paper (Belenkiy 2010), I proposed that the murder of Hypatia by a clique of Bishop Cyril's zealots resulted from her involvement in the conflict between the Roman and Alexandrian Churches over the date of Easter in year 417. The murder would have been committed in March 416 after she had performed *controversial astronomical observations* that supported the Roman date over the Alexandrian one.

This version faces severe problems from various sides. Therefore, I suggest another scenario (Belenkiy 2016), where an unorthodox stance of the Novatian Church on determining the time of Easter and early Passover celebration in 414 triggered the chain of events leading to Hypatia's murder. This scenario places the murder in March 415 and offers a unique time frame for all the related events. Here Hypatia displays *astronomy skills* that justify her subsequent historical reputation. I also shed light on the immediate circumstances of her murder, specifically suggesting it happened on the day she was making the *equinoctial observations*.

Finally, I propose instituting a memorial day for Hypatia on the day of the vernal equinox. Here is an online petition: <https://www.change.org/p/canada-s-parliament-commemorating-the-first-female-astronomer-hypatia-of-alexandria>

Bensick, Carol (UCLA Center for the Study of Women, USA):

Julia Ward Howe: A 19th Century American Woman's Philosophical Formation in a Boston Lecture

In 1869, in a series of Sunday afternoon public lectures offered by the far-left religious extremists of Boston, Julia Ward Howe gave a talk entitled "Religion in America." At this time Howe had already

given a series of parlor lectures called “Practical Ethics,” including, for example, one called “Doubt and Belief,” and published three articles in the official Unitarian journal not only on religious but also a political subject, called “The Ideal State.” It was understood that her 1869 talk would be philosophical nature. Howe has been undergoing recovery as a philosopher since the 1991 volume of Mary Ellen Waithe’s *History of Women Philosophers*. After a slow start the recovery has recently accelerated, uncovering lectures from the 1880s, most impressively, on Plato’s Republic and “The Result of Kant’s Philosophy,” out of many more. This prompts the question: how did an American woman who grew up before the opening of college or even high school education to women attain the capacity to speak on Plato and Kant? Howe gives some version of her education in her 1900 autobiographical *Reminiscences* and is autobiographical article, but none of them is as deep as the preface to “Religion in America.” In this paper I will describe this account, ending with a description of a revealing newspaper response to it.

Boch, Michael (University of Wuppertal, Germany/Vienna University, Austria)

Ingeborg Heidemann as a protagonist of Post-Neokantianism

Ingeborg Heidemann (1915-1987) is one of the most important Kant scholars of the 20th century. In Gerhardt Funke's obituary for her he wrote that the work of Kant Studies, as it has been since 1969, is unthinkable without Ingeborg Heidemann (cf. Funke Gerhardt: In Memoriam Ingeborg Heidemann 1989). Despite her special contributions to the research on Kant, she never held a professorship during her active period and only rose up to a C4 position at her retirement. Heidemann was a student of Gottfried Martin and Heinz Heimsoeth, receiving her doctorate in 1955 from the University of Mainz, her habilitation in 1958 in Bonn. Not only did she serve with Gottfried Martin on the board of the new Kant Society shortly after its founding, but she also edited the supplementary issues of the *Kant-Studien*. First alone and then with the support of Joachim Kopper and Rudolf Malter, until her death in 1987. Nevertheless, she is not merely an orthodox Kant-exegete as can be seen in her writings on Scheler's Kant Critique, the Concept of Categories in Kant and Nicolai Hartmann and especially in her habilitation on the concept of play with a focus on Kant and the late work of Martin Heidegger. Ingeborg Heidemann's thinking is of outstanding importance, especially in the light of the philosophical current of Post-Neokantianism, since, like her famous colleague Hans Wagner, she always researched its systematic extension through phenomenology, despite an adherence to Kantian transcendental philosophy. As one of the very few female protagonists of systematic transcendental philosophy after 1945, Heidemann's work and her sociological influence on science will be highlighted in the planned talk. In addition to her classification in Post-Neokantianism, her syntheses of phenomenology and transcendental philosophy will be the main focus of the presentation.

Bonfim, Sarah (UNICAMP, Brazil)

Beyond Rights of Woman: the experience of dependence in Mary Wollstonecraft

Mary Wollstonecraft, prior to *Vindication of the Right of Woman* (1792), was a writer of pedagogical works. Two are noteworthy: *Thoughts on the Education of Daughters* (1786) and *Original Stories from Real Life* (1788). Both are works written early in Wollstonecraft's literary career and present what can be called the genesis of vindicatory thinking. Although these books do not have the same assertive tone as *Rights of Woman*, both *Thoughts* and *Original Stories* propose to present alternative models of female education to other books that were popular at the time. The format in which these books are written, *Thoughts* in the form of conduct literature, and *Original Stories* in the form of children's stories, present elements that encourage women to pursue virtue and the development of reason for themselves. Also, another Wollstonecraft book that deserves a highlight is *Mary, a Fiction* (1788) a romance about a girl that is different from Sophie and Clarissa - the common women portrayed in the eighteenth century. All the three-books are different in the form of writing, however, the three share a very important theme in Wollstonecraft's writing: the experience of the dependent. Wollstonecraft has an alternative approach to the concept of liberty, shedding light on the experience of women and children living without agency. In this respect, this conference has a dual aim. The first objective is to present how Wollstonecraft portrays the experience of dependence in her first books. The second objective is to point out the alternatives that lead to emancipation, present in the works *Thoughts*, *Original Stories*, and *Mary*.

Bonnet, Annabelle (CESPRA, EHESS-CNRS, France; UFES, Brazil)

Jenny d'Héricourt (1809-1875) A forgotten precursor of feminist philosophy

Feminist philosophy is a current of philosophical thought commonly considered to have originated in the 20th century and to have flourished internationally after the Second World War. However, its constitution is older, and finds, in the French case, its contemporary roots in the work of a woman philosopher of the XIXth century, still widely marginalized today, named Jenny d'Héricourt (1809-1875). Nearly a century before Simone de Beauvoir and her internationally acclaimed philosophical work, *The Second Sex*, Jenny d'Héricourt challenged, in an avant-garde and unprecedented way in the history of French philosophy, the gendered foundations of society but also of the history of philosophy. In this presentation, I propose to explore her life and to introduce her work, in particular her theory *La femme affranchie (The emancipated woman)*, in order to fill a gap in the history of feminist philosophy as well as in the history of philosophy in general.

Carbone, Guelfo M. (Roma Tre University, Italy)

A diary of war and persecution. Janine Bouissounouse and the Anti-Nazi Resistance

The first 1946 issue of the journal *Les Temps Modernes*, co-founded by Jean-Paul Sartre and Simone de Beauvoir in 1945, collects three articles related to the catastrophic situation of Germany right after the world war. The section is entitled *Documents*, and includes two well-known testimonies on Martin Heidegger: the *Entretien avec Martin Heidegger* by Maurice de Gandillac, and Alfred (instead of Frédéric) de Towarnicki's account of a *Visite à Martin Heidegger*. As first document, however, the section presents excerpts from a diary authored by the French historian, novelist and film critic Janine Bouissounouse. These materials, as well as the author, are less known than the reports of the encounters with the famous thinker, but are, in turn, extremely valuable for the testimony of that very moment of distress.

The editorial note placed before Bouissounouse's document explains that the publication of the diary was forthcoming, under the title *Maison occupée*. The excerpts proposed to the French readers last from the end of February 1942 to August 1944, and are entitled *Trois allemands contre l'Allemagne*. The title, 'Three Germans against Germany,' refers to German members of the Anti-Nazi resistance that Bouissounouse had the chance to meet in Paris.

The whole diary begins in July 1940 and provides an account of her daily life in Paris under the Nazi occupation, during the regime of the 'Vichygoti' led by 'Pétaingetorice,' as she writes, including her readings of Nietzsche, Marx and Plato. What strikes the most, though, are the considerations on the misery of war and on all its horrors, particularly with respect to the account of the interrogation by the Gestapo suffered by Bouissounouse herself, to the first dreadful signs of the mass persecution of the Jews, but also to the traces of the rising anti-Nazi Resistance that Bouissounouse started patiently to collect, in order to verify the existence of a resistance and to believe in it. The proposed paper focuses on Bouissounouse's gradual liaising with the German members of the French Resistance, until the second occupation of her 'home', as she reports, by the Allies at the moment of liberation in August 1944.

Coffee, Alan (King's College London, UK)

Nancy Kingsbury Wollstonecraft, Social Structures and the Logic of the Logic of Non-Domination

When the writings of Nancy Kingsbury Wollstonecraft surfaced in 2019, having been almost wholly neglected by scholars since their publication in the 1820s, they invited an inevitable and tantalising comparison with her far more famous sister-in-law, Mary Wollstonecraft, especially since Kingsbury had written an article on "The Natural Rights of Woman". Irrespective of the Wollstonecraft

connection, however, Kingsbury's writing stands on its own merits as deserving of serious scholarship by historians of women in philosophy. Nevertheless, reading Kingsbury in the light of her predecessor is highly instructive and helps both bring out what is distinctive about her conclusions and place her in the context of post-Wollstonecraftian thought in the nineteenth century. Kingsbury draws on a similar set of foundational principles as Wollstonecraft, which I place within the republican tradition of political philosophy – freedom, equality, virtue, the common good – across the three articles that we have. Focusing on the issue of education, she argues that increasing their access to education will do little to improve women's intellectual development unless there is an accompanying and extensive restructuring of social and economic norms. In so doing, she takes further one aspect of Wollstonecraft's thought and anticipates and prefigures some of the later arguments of feminists and abolitionists writing in the same tradition.

Conti, Silvia (LUMSA University of Rome, Italy)

Iris Murdoch and the mystical female voice

The intervention aims to trace and deepen the feminist echo that runs through the philosophical-moral reflection of Iris Murdoch, one of the most significant and singular female voices of the twentieth century. The main purpose of this contribution is to highlight how the feminist *file rouge* inherent in Murdoch's thought allows us to evade a limited vision of philosophy, traditionally understood as the exclusive domain of the logical. Dwelling on the mystical female inheritance assimilated by Murdoch, we intend to overcome a rationalist prejudice that has relegated many women philosophers to the sphere of the extravagant, the fictional and the false-philosophical. The path of listening to Murdoch's female voice will be articulated in two stages, according to the development of her own moral reflection. We will identify a first critical-polemic moment, a *pars destruens*, in which Murdoch raises strong objections to two apparently distant traditions of thought, logical positivism and existentialism, due to their same liberal vision of the individual. Murdoch's critique of the liberal conception of the individual will be interpreted as a starting point for the affirmation of a different anthropological paradigm, more inclusive, which places emphasis on human reflexivity and emotionality. We will then proceed to analyse a second, constructive phase, a *pars construens*, in which Murdoch engages in the substantial elaboration of her moral perspective as an ethics of vision. Murdoch's redefinition of the subject as a historical moral agent always engaged in a process of moral refinement – optical adjustment and outward decentralization “away from the self [...] towards the great surprising variety of the world” – will be read in the light of Julian of Norwich's mystical legacy – beyond that of Simone Weil's. The mystical excess of a typically feminine word, which goes

beyond the logical, will prove to be the only possible way by which Murdoch tries to describe the otherwise ineffable richness of human experience.

Costa, Emanuele (Vanderbilt University, USA)

Transcendence and Immanence in Anne Conway

In this paper, I examine the metaphysics elaborated by Viscountess Anne Finch Conway in the effort of determining the meaning she assigned to the notions of transcendence and immanence. In the Early Modern period, her philosophy is one of the most original attempts towards an integration of notions deriving from Lurianic Kabbalah and Sufism into debates stemming from the confrontation of mainstream Catholicism and Protestantism with their most heterodox cognates, such as Quakerism. Responding to these variegated influences, Conway elaborated a unique response to the problem of transcendence, immanence, and the presence of God in the world.

Costello, Sean M. (University of Michigan, USA)

Anne Conway on Memory

Anne Conway's understanding of the faculty of memory in *The Principles of the Most Ancient and Modern Philosophy* crucially intersects with her larger psychological and metaphysical projects. However, it has, thus far, largely been overlooked in the secondary literature. It is the purpose of this article to rectify this omission and emphasize the greater role which this faculty has to play in Conway's philosophy by systematically examining her account of memory.

In this project I first focus on elucidating the key features of Conway's account of memory by considering the two kinds of objects which are preserved by this faculty and then examining the characteristics belonging to the faculty itself, particularly insofar as they are revealed in *Principles* VI.11. Next, I turn to develop a hitherto unnoticed concern arising from Conway's conception of memory which threatens to significantly undermine her theological and soteriological commitments to both an "infinitely and immutably good" God (VII.1.42, see also: I.1.9) and to the eventual union of all creatures with God through universal salvation (VII.1.42-43, IX.9.70). This concern, which provides yet another significant reason for why Conway's account of memory merits further attention, arises from the fact that, while memory requires a particularly robust kind of bodily darkness and opacity (VI.11.38-39), higher creatures, being closer to God, are more spiritual and, hence, *less* bodily and dark (VI.11.39, VII.1.42, VIII.4.61), which suggests that such creatures should also be *less* capable of exercising their faculties of memory. Since memory is also required in order to perform several higher-level cognitive activities, it appears that – in contrast to the empirical fact of the matter and to Conway's understanding of God's goodness and justice – rising in the *scala naturae* would

involve a sort of cognitive *punishment*, rather than a reward. Further, it seems that higher creatures, being thus cognitively impoverished, should also be less capable of living good lives, which would stymie their ability to progress further towards a salvific union with God. Having laid out this worry and its implications, I then consider the possibilities for alleviating the difficulty. After rejecting several options, I posit a species-relativist interpretation of the physiological darkness requirements for memory, and contend that this reading, in addition to being Conway's implicitly intended view, is capable of successfully overcoming the worry posited here. This interpretation, then, in addition to clarifying Conway's understanding of the faculty of memory and emphasizing its significant place in her larger philosophy, also restores coherence to her theological and soteriological projects.

Detel, Veronika (University of Hamburg, Germany)

Agnotology and Epistemic Oppression: Towards Methodologies of Inclusion in the History of Political Thought

The German political science subdiscipline *Political Theory and the History of Thought* has increased efforts to inclusion in staff, research and teaching in the last years. Established political theorists and historiographers have called for diversifying research and teaching (Patzelt 2013: 506; Reese-Schäfer/Salzborn 2015). Following an influential feminist article (Gorriahn/Riede 2019), a working group named *Gender, Diversity and Anti-Discrimination* was formed. With regard to the feminist critique of the canon of political theory and the history of thought, two approaches have been distinguished: canon critique implying an intentional disruption or abolition of the canon on the one hand, attempts at complementing the canon on the other hand (Rosenzweig 2005).

Against this backdrop, the paper compares the concepts of agnotology and epistemic injustice and discusses their implications for the two options of dealing with the canon of Political Theory and the History of Thought. Within discussions about exclusions in knowledge production, these concepts are among the most recent ones. Agnotology – as proposed by Proctor and taken up by Schiebinger – refers to a science of the “structural production of ignorance” (Proctor 2008: 3) or the “absence of knowledge (as) an outcome of cultural and political struggles” (Schiebinger 2004: 237). Epistemic oppression means “epistemic exclusions [that] produce deficiencies in social knowledge” (Dotson 2012: 24). After comparing their respective taxonomies or conceptual distinctions and implications, the paper turns to discuss how these approaches can inform reflections and practice in the classroom. Drawing on hooks' insights into engaged pedagogy and its view of theory as liberatory practice, research and teaching experience in four seminars are discussed: *Political Theory and the History of Thought: Gender-critical Perspectives, Social Contract Theory and its Critiques, Political Thought*

in the Age of Revolutions and Ideas and Concepts of Political Freedom. Each of these seminars attempted to increase inclusion compared to standard introductory textbooks.

Dold, Kayla (University of Ottawa, Canada)

All Men are Mortal: Novel title, ontological claim, and Simone de Beauvoir's primary philosophical premise

Introduction: In *The Ethics of Ambiguity* (1947), 20th c. French existentialist Simone de Beauvoir writes that “freedom is the source from which all significations and all values spring. It is the original condition of all justification of existence.” The relationship between freedom and existence is central to Beauvoir's *oeuvre*, conventionally referred to as the ‘problem of the other.’ This paper explores the triptych relationship between freedom, existence, and others in Beauvoir's novel, *All Men Are Mortal* (*Tous les hommes sont mortels*) published one year prior to *The Ethics of Ambiguity* in 1946.

Argument: For Beauvoir, freedom is necessarily embodied, and as human beings, our embodiment is subject to mortality. Thus, the title of Beauvoir's novel turns out to be an ontological claim and her primary philosophical premise. This paper demonstrates how Beauvoir's conception of freedom flows from this premise. It argues that *All Men are Mortal* describes our ontology by conceptualizing mortality as both the end to, and the means of, our freedom.

Analysis: This argument is made using literary analysis and phenomenological hermeneutics. It is split into two experiences. The first demonstrates that mortality is the end to our freedom. Beauvoir argues this by juxtaposing imagery of decay with *All Men Are Mortal*'s protagonist, Regina's, experience of existential anxiety. The second demonstrates that mortality is not only the end to our freedom, but the means of exercising it in the first place. An analysis of the character Fosca's experience of *immortality* reveals how Beauvoir connects her primary premise, all people are mortal, with the ability to create meaning. This analysis reveals Beauvoir's logical progression from the premise that all people are mortal to the conclusion, as articulated in *The Ethics of Ambiguity*, that freedom is necessary to justify existence—or, in other words, the key to a meaningful life.

**Egbai, Mary Julius (University of Calabar, Nigeria) and Abakedi, Dominic Effiong
(University of Calabar, Nigeria)**

Girl-child trafficking and the burden of hermeneutical obstruction

This paper examined from an historical perspective, how hermeneutical practices have helped in fostering the unjust practices of girl-child labour and trafficking in the past decade, despite the efforts of governments of different countries and international organizations such as the United Nations to combat them. Using the method of a critical analysis of related literature, and some victimology-

reports that are narratives of some girl-child victims, the paper identified certain practices that can rightly be described as forms of hermeneutical injustice as some of the obstacles that have be addressed if the war against girl-child labor and girl-child trafficking must be won. The paper argued among other things, that bringing the voices and experiences of girl-child victims to the classrooms by including them in school curricula, will be beneficial in equipping other female children with the needed hermeneutical resources that will be useful in making sense about instances of hermeneutical injustices that often help in fostering these crimes.

Fasko, Manuel (University of Basel, Switzerland)

A Powerful Metaphysics? A case for Mary Shepherd's proto-dispositionalism

In her second major work – the *Essays on the Perception of an External Universe* (EPEU) from 1827 Mary Shepherd (1777–1847), “Scotland’s first female philosopher” (Mc Robert, “The Causal Relation”,5), repeatedly defines mind *and* matter in terms of their respective powers (EPEU 120, 153, 155, 242, 388). Despite its obvious importance Shepherd notion of ‘power’ has attracted comparatively little attention. Apart from Antonia LoLordo’s article “Powers in Britain” (2021), it has not been the topic of scholarly scrutiny in its own right.

LoLordo (2021, 235) persuasively argues that Shepherd endorses a “powers-first metaphysics” and implicitly raises the question whether she also commits herself to a ‘powers-*only* metaphysics’ (2021, 241). Building on LoLordo’s insights, my goal is to establish that we ought to answer this question affirmatively. In distinction to the likes of Locke (*Essay* II.xxi.ixx) Shepherd does not believe that powers need to inhere in something such as a substance. At least as far as the created world is concerned, Shepherd’s powers are the fundamental metaphysical entities (cf. LoLordo 2021, 242). That is, in more contemporary parlance, they seem to be ‘bare dispositions’.

Yet, since the created world, incl. the powers that constitute it, is caused by God, Shepherd’s powers are arguably best understood as ‘based dispositions’.

I will argue for this proto-dispositionalist reading of Shepherd in three steps. First, I outline the historical background against which Shepherd develops her “powers-first” metaphysics. Second, I analyze her characterizations of mind and matter as powers in more detail. Third, I take a closer look at Shepherd’s remarks on substance and on God to show that neither are odds with reading Shepherd as a proto-dispositionalist. In fact, some of Shepherd’s remarks seemingly suggest that God is nothing but a power or first cause, which would indeed justify calling her metaphysics ‘powers-*only*’.

Felappi, Giulia (University of Southampton, UK)

“The inverted commas have a function similar to that of the symbol “ \aleph ” of musical notation.”

Langer on saving logic from a metaphysical limbo

In my paper, I will discuss Langer’s notion of logic. The purpose will be two-fold.

First, I will show how wide-ranging, inter-disciplinary and unusual for her times Langer’s view of logic was:

The extra-systematic function of verbs seems thus to account for many of the supposed “alogical” features of logic. ... The alogical factors of meaning, truth, assertion, etc., which early beset Mr. Russell and recently drove Mr. Wittgenstein to Mysticism, appear to me to have sprung from the error of treating logic as essentially a study of *propositional* forms. But the logic which concerns itself with all sorts of forms allows for an analysis of structures *including* propositional forms, and promises to save some important logical relations from their present metaphysical limbo. (1927, p. 129)

Thanks to her more ecumenical view of what logic is, and to her extensive readings from authors in very different traditions, she could rely on reflections from natural languages and the philosophy of art and music.

Second, I will show how fruitful her approach to logic is, as compared to the more restricted approach of Russell and the first Wittgenstein. I will argue that by relying on considerations from disciplines usually considered *alogical*, she could solve problems that were unsolvable from the lens of a more restricted notion of logic. I will show this by using, as example, the so-called problem of the unity of the proposition, which Russell himself explicitly stated as an unsolvable difficulty from the point of view of the logic of his *Principles*.

Fernando, Asha (University of Sri Jayawardenepura, Sri Lanka)

Gargi Vachaknavi, A women thinker in the Vedic Period: philosophical reflections

Gargi Vachaknavi, the natural philosopher in ancient traditional Hindu philosophy, was born about c.7th century BCE. According to the Vedic literature she was in deep understanding of Vedic and Upanishad teachings. The historical text *Brhadaranyaka* Upanishad records of her participation in the philosophical debate called *Brahmajana* which was organised by King Janaka of Videha, and her challenging of the philosopher and sage Yajnavalkya. Therefore, she was glorified as the women with higher knowledge or wise women “Brahmavadini” in Sanskrit language, that means someone with supreme knowledge. There is historical evidence that she had practiced yoga and awakened

Kundalini or the spiritual energy and realized the Self or atman. She had keen interest in Vedic scriptures. Her intellectual influence was her father Sage Garga who lived in 800 BCE. This intellectual woman engaged in dealing with metaphysical and cosmological issues in those days.

Brihadaranyaka Upanishad mentions that among the philosophical debates in Videha she was the only woman who raised questions and involved in arguments about the ultimate reality in this universe. Her initial argument with Yajnavalkya tended to be highly metaphysical, such as unending status of the soul, away from practical situations. Her questions were mainly focused on the origin and the existence of this universe.

This research paper will explore the place of women's and their philosophical arguments in ancient and traditional philosophies in India. This will also explore the role of Indian women in philosophical debate in 7th Century BCE in critical manner and the contribution of women in academic philosophy in ancient times based on textual analysis.

Forbes, Allaren (Mc Master University, Canada)

On Wooing

One of the interpretive questions which has inspired much debate in the ongoing recovery of overlooked women philosophers is whether these figures were feminists, or at least minimally, whether they espoused feminist views. This question is fraught; contemporary and historical feminisms may be so different as to be conceptually distinct. Nevertheless, I want to suggest that there is a sense in which three such women philosophers – Marie de Gournay, Margaret Cavendish, and Mary Astell – can usefully be understood as being engaged in a paradigmatically feminist project: an analysis of wooing as an iteration of an epistemic dimension of patriarchal power.

Wooing sets the stage for – and may even *cause* – the ills of marriage. Indeed, wooing determines the possible trajectories of women's lives. Strikingly, Gournay, Cavendish, and Astell seem to imply that wooers knew that they were leveraging patriarchal epistemic asymmetries to secure control of women, knowingly truncating women's epistemic agency. In the following, I argue that Gournay, Cavendish, and Astell were engaged in the feminist project of articulating the epistemic dimension of patriarchal power most clearly identified in practices of wooing. I further argue that wooing, as identified by Gournay, Cavendish, and Astell, is usefully understood as *epistemic obscuring*, a willful misperception of the central epistemic features of socio-political relations.

To make my case, I begin from Gournay, Cavendish, and Astell's awareness of background conditions of epistemic asymmetry before moving to an account of wooing as comprised of flattery and securing consent. I argue that Gournay, Cavendish, and Astell's discussion of these phenomena as epistemically deleterious suggests a conception of wooing as a practice of epistemic obscuring. In

closing, I suggest that this analysis of wooing amounts to an articulation (and problematization) of the epistemic dimension of early modern patriarchal power.

Franco, Juliana (Universidade de Campinas, Brazil)

Gilda de Mello Souza: Woman philosopher and art critic in the Brazil of the 20th Century

A Brazilian art critic, essayist, and professor of Aesthetics who lived in the twentieth century, Gilda de Mello e Souza was one of the most outstanding Brazilian modernist women in Brazil, academically and institutionally speaking. She influenced generations of intellectuals, critics, and Professors who reflect on culture and art in the country. One of the few women to attend the University of São Paulo's Faculty of Philosophy, Sciences, and Letters (FLC-USP) when it was founded in the early 1930s, she graduated in Philosophy and obtained a doctorate in Social Sciences. She was an assistant professor of Sociology, and later founded the discipline of Aesthetics and headed the Philosophy Department at USP. Her intellectual legacy is still little explored in philosophy in Brazil. For this reason, my research seeks to contribute to the diffusion of knowledge about it by investigating her life and work, which includes researching in her Archive. As a professor of Aesthetics, her students report that Gilda adopted a teaching methodology focused specifically on the analysis of the artistic object. At the same time, as an essayist, she wrote on fashion, cinema, theatre, literature, and visual arts. Therefore, the author bases her analyses not only on Aesthetics but also on the history and sociology of art, going beyond the compartmentalised and rational scope of Philosophy. That is to say that Gilda's work is intrinsically multifaceted and interdisciplinary. This presentation will seek, firstly, to briefly present Gilda's intellectual performance and her published works, passing by the explanation of some main notions such as "poor aesthetics" and "myopic look", which reflect both the original way she approached the arts, Brazilian culture and the feminine artistic production inserted here.

Gallego, Maria (Boston College, USA)

Iris Murdoch, Imagination and the Good Life

The aim of this presentation is to recover Murdoch's concept of imagination and how it influences the way we as moral agents are able to have a good life. I will center this recovering on her last and largest work on philosophy, *Metaphysics as a Guide to Morals*. The first thing Murdoch warns us about is what concept of imagination we are going to use. In the history of thought we find that imagination is associated with deception. However, Murdoch wants to rescue an understanding of imagination that is associated with creativity and truth: "[an active faculty] freely and creatively exploring the world, moving toward the expression and elucidation (and in art celebration) of what is true and deep." (1992, 321) But this free activity is not only peculiar to the artist. Murdoch wants us

to consider it in the moral sphere as well. Thanks to this activity, the moral agent can see beyond what happens to her: “The good (better) man is *liberated* from selfish fantasy, can see himself as others see him, imagine the needs of other people, love unselfishly, lucidly envisage and desire what is truly valuable.” (1992, 331) Imagination, therefore, could help us to differentiate between the appearances of what is good or pleasurable, and thus be able to discover what is really good or pleasurable. It is not denied that we should have a theoretical knowledge of what is good. But unlike imagination, theoretical knowledge does not really allow us to differentiate between appearances. Imagination deals with the contingency of the world, with appearances. What Murdoch then proposes to us is to consider that morality and our desire to live a good life has to do with the contingency of the world and how we respond to it. Imagination may help us in this endeavor.

Glantzi, Evina (Greece)

How the Current Philosophical Discussion on Love would be different if Tullia d’ Aragona’s Theory had been included in the Canon

Tullia d’ Aragona (ca. 1510-1556) is the only female philosopher who participates in the Italian Renaissance tradition of love dialogues that are written according to the platonic model (Russell, 21). In her *Dialogue on the Infinity of love* (Dialogo della infinità di Amore), she defends equality between women and men and she develops an account of honest love as a kind of union-between women and men-which equally includes the body and the soul. By drawing upon passages of the *Dialogue* and historical information regarding the life of Tullia d’ Aragona and the publication of this work, I argue that, at a closer examination, her *Dialogue* is a work of both ethics and political philosophy. This is because her theory of love is built upon the defense of gender equality and it also incorporates implicit concerns of social justice. Examining what I identify as her political philosophy, I argue that it shares several common elements with the current strand of egalitarian-liberal feminism. Turning to the current discussion of love as a union, I explore some conceptions of love and I show that they are either blind or insufficiently responding to the challenges posed by gender and women’s social and political subordination in societies. I argue that an early incorporation of d’ Aragona’s work in the canon would have prevented the aforementioned problems because it would have established, even from the Renaissance, that there is a political dimension in the approach of love as a union that should be successfully addressed.

Aleksandra Gomulczak (Adam Mickiewicz University, Poland)

Eugenia Ginsberg-Blaustein: Husserl Scholar from the Lvov-Warsaw School

The aim of this talk is to introduce and discuss the work of Eugenia Ginsberg-Blaustein, one of the members of the Lvov-Warsaw School (hereafter LWS). I will examine two of her papers where she critically engages with Husserl's concepts of wholes and parts (Ginsberg 1929) and with his concepts of existential dependence and independence (Ginsberg-Blaustein 1931/1982).

As a member of LWS Ginsberg-Blaustein was trained in a certain approach to philosophizing. The main components of this approach are rigour and clarity regarding the style of writing and justification of statements. This is one of the reasons why LWS is generally perceived as belonging to the analytic philosophical tradition (cf. Woleński 1989). However, outside the "mainstream" philosophy of LWS, we encounter philosophers such as Ginsberg-Blaustein with their deep engagement with Husserl's phenomenology. Which was an original approach given the "scientific" attitude of some LWS' members. Moreover, what is of importance here is the tradition she refers to, i.e. in these papers she discusses not only Husserl, but also Brentano, Stumpf, Meinong, Twardowski, Pfänder, and Ingarden.

I will argue that, although Ginsberg-Blaustein didn't identify herself as a phenomenologist, her contribution to Husserl studies is of great interest from a historical perspective. This is because of two reasons. First, she not only pursues incisive criticism of some of Husserl's concepts and theses but provides her own corrections of the errors she recognized. Second, she does that by application of the method specific for LWS, i.e. a detailed semiotic analysis, which allows her to recognize inconsistencies in some of Husserl's definitions and statements. My aim is to provide a reconstruction of her method and to discuss the results of her study.

Goulart, Luana (Universidade Estadual do Ceará, Brazil)

Education and Home. Political perspectives on women in the work of Mary Wollstonecraft and Nísia Floresta

Some important feminist philosophers, such as Simone de Beauvoir, could be described as having contributed relevantly to the task of understanding actions carried out within political communities. Their specific perspective in approaching this issue, however, sets them apart from other – mostly male – thinkers in the history of philosophy, since they dedicated themselves to investigating and analyzing the meanings of the actions and their impacts for a particular group in these communities: women. In the specific case of women's actions, for example, we can say that one of the common traits in the proposals and analyses carried out by thinkers whom we usually describe as feminists is precisely to point out shortcomings in how the meanings of these actions are understood by showing

how such interpretations end up generating or maintaining injustices and inequalities that concern the social functions and roles of women within these political communities. It is precisely in this direction that this presentation seeks to contribute.

Taking as a starting point some of the main political ideas of Simone de Beauvoir about women's freedom — e.g. expanding their participation in so-called “public sphere” and, at the same time, transforming the meaning of their actions and functions at home —, I will analyze the distinctions between political aspects of ideas of two women philosophers: the English Mary Wollstonecraft, and the Brazilian Nísia Floresta. The talk will be divided in three moments: in the first, we will understand Wollstonecraft's and Floresta's concerns and claims about women's participation in “male activities” — most especially education. In the second, we will comprehend their perspective about women's actions in so-called “private sphere”, especially their function and practices at home, within the family. Following some of de Beauvoir's most famous concepts and ideas about how women's freedom depends on a political change in both spheres, we will be able to identify, in the third moment, the tensions that emerge from contrasting these political aspects of their thought with the interpretive contours they lend to the meaning of women's actions in each of the two spheres.

Groot, Eveline (EUR, Netherlands)

Love of Liberty: Germaine de Staël's Sentimentalist Philosophy

In the last chapter of her *Considérations sur la Révolution française* (1818), Germaine de Staël (1766–1817) describes love of liberty as a sentiment in which “all that we honor” is included. Love of liberty is a source for morality as it leads to a wish for social order, feelings of empathy, and virtuous action.

The work of Germaine de Staël is going through a revival and current research demonstrates that her influence on the history of liberal political thought is immense. But as the chapter on *Love of Liberty* demonstrates, De Staël's political ideas on liberty cannot be separated from her philosophical ideas about our human nature and morality. Therefore, I deem it important to look at the whole philosophical project of De Staël, and specifically to De Staël's sentimentalism.

De Staël's theory of the *impassioned* nature of human beings, as set out in her *De l'influence des passions* (1796), provides an insightful account of her sentimentalist theory. In this work, De Staël argues that human beings have a dual rational and sentimental nature. In order to act morally, De Staël believes that human beings should be allowed to freely incorporate sentiments in their process of decision making.

In *De la littérature* (1800), De Staël expands on this theory and argues that by being a form of *philosophie sensible*, literature has the potential to attribute to human progress, also in the form of

morality and liberty, by addressing precisely this dual nature of our human psychology. In this work, De Staël describes *sensibilité* in Rousseauian terms: as the foundation that awakens an openness for internalising abstract ideas, and thus offers a condition for knowledge. Additionally, the same *sensibilité* evokes political open-mindedness as well as virtuous behaviour.

Giulia Guidara (University of Pisa, Italy)

**Female Humanism. Gender Stereotypes and Self-perception in Isotta Nogarola and
Cassandra Fedele**

During the fifteenth century, in Italy there are some women of the higher levels of society that study ancient classics. Female humanists have familiarity with a wide range of ancient works and are admitted to scholarly circles, just like male humanists. However, women can't use their learning in the same way as men, i.e. in order to excel in professional life: domestic life is their destiny. How do women humanists perceive this situation? Is their self-concept affected by gender stereotypes? And which are their ideas on "female nature"?

My paper will address these issues, using as case studies Isotta Nogarola (1418–1466) and Cassandra Fedele (1470–1558). In particular, I will focus on Nogarola's *De pari aut impari Evae atque Adae peccato* (1451/3?), that deals with female nature, and Fedele's correspondence with queens and duchesses of Spain, Hungary and the Italian city-states, where women patrons are depicted as role models for the female sex. In this way, I would like to examine the interaction between gender stereotypes and self-concept in women that are aware of having the same cognitive skills as men, but not the same opportunities.

Head, Jonathan (Keele University, UK)

Conway's World Soul and Monism

The question of Conway's monism is one that has received an increasing amount of attention in the literature. This paper seeks to shed new light on this issue by connecting it with Conway's account of the role of a 'Middle Nature' as a kind of world soul. The main issue with regard to the question of Conway's monism is whether or not nature is structured in such a way that it is a single concrete individual (a 'token monist' reading would respond affirmatively, a 'type monist' reading would not). With Conway's assumption of a kind of world soul, it may be that there are other metaphysical commitments at play in her system that would make it appear that nature is a single individual, without there being any commitment to token monism. The world soul is able to fulfil functions in unifying and harmonising nature that could otherwise be secured through token monism, but is not ultimately required within Conway's philosophy. In addition, if this is the case, it may explain why

Conway sometimes appears to be gesturing towards token monism in the text of her work, the *Principia*, while only in fact committing herself to a type monism. In helping to settle this matter, it is worth considering Conway's account of a 'Middle Nature', which she labels as Christ, and the role it plays in mediating between God and creation. In considering what Christ both does and does not do (for example, with regard to its creative and vivifying role), we can see that Conway in fact does not have good reason to posit nature as a single individual. Thus, in the absence of overwhelming textual evidence, I argue that we should ultimately read Conway as a type monist.

Heijmeskamp, Thijs (Erasmus School of Philosophy, Netherlands)

Jane Addams and empathy as a method for democracy

Laura Jane Addams (1860 – 1935) was one of the most famous settlement activists, feminists, and social reformers of the progressive era of the USA. Despite her being awarded the Nobel peace prize, after her death her writings were not given much academic attention. Within the history of philosophy and sociology, she was positioned as merely applying the ideas of other pragmatists philosophers, mainly the ideas of Dewey. Pragmatism is the philosophical tradition that takes practical consequences as primary, in order to overcome unfounded dualisms. In recent decades this characterization of Addams has fortunately begun to change, as Addams is now seen as one of the prominent early members of pragmatism, and responsible for further developing and radicalizing pragmatism's social themes.

In this talk, I address Addams' central idea of *sympathetic knowledge*. Sympathetic knowledge is the idea that we can come to understand other's experiences by engaging in dialogical listening, through which relationships are established that are based on sympathetic or affectionate interpretation. Sympathetic knowledge is a practice for coming to know other's life world and must be seen as an action with others that in turn allows for further possibilities of action, both ethical and political. Sympathetic knowledge always begins with perplexity, that is a disruption of experience, of previously held knowledge. It is experience that is imaginatively extrapolated. Thus, sympathetic knowledge is a process of learning that does not simply occur through facts, but in one's openness to new experience. Sympathetic knowledge is both emotional and rational. It is a form of caring for others that has the power to disrupt previously held ideas. I end with sketching some manners in which the works of Addams and the notion of sympathetic knowledge can provide a relevant contribution to current debates on democracy, empathy, social progress, care ethics and politics, and epistemology.

Hogenbirk, Hugo (University of Groningen, Netherlands)

**Processual Plenitude in Anne Conway's Principles of the Most Ancient and Modern
Philosophy**

Conway, in her *Principles of the Most Ancient and Modern Philosophy*, makes use of a principle of plenitude (C2.S4). Her application is however not spelled out – in this paper I suggest a reading in particular for the scope (i.e. the answer to the question what is maximized) of her use of plenitude. The conclusion is that she does not maximize over creatures as static entities, multiplied over time, but creatures as dynamic seats of lived histories. The focus of God's activity is maximizing these lived histories. I'll argue this to be the case in two ways: first, I'll show how on her consideration of creatures as eternal (C2.S5 & C6.S6), 'maximizing creatures in creation' is ambiguous between creatures as processes and as things. Secondly, I'll show that reading processual plenitude into Conway helps with tying together her views on the identity of creatures over time (C6) and the goodness of creation which allows for freedom and the fall (C6 & C7). Finally, I leverage these findings for the claims that Conway can be interpreted as a process philosopher. (Thomas, 2017).

Holda, Margaret (University of Łódź, Poland)

**The Female Genius and the Narrative of Entrapment: Virginia Woolf's Story of Judith
Shakespeare**

Virginia Woolf picks up on women's voices which preceded hers, and though she is not a revolutionary like Mary Wollstonecraft, her voice comes as a powerful polemic of a thinker engaged to show that women are not genetically inferior to men, but it is the outside circumstances that make them disadvantaged and lacking in power to combat oppression and establish their own position as capable members of society. Woolf takes the courage to publicly discuss the pressing issues of her time. The novelist is deeply aware that women's privation was historically determined – for centuries women lacked in privacy and independence. They were denied education and thus had scanty possibilities to overthrow conditions which were unfavorable for them and to transgress the rigid mental frameworks which put them in a disadvantageous position. The social situation of women in modernity is not the outcome of an individual attitude but the result of a long, historical process. The dramatic story of Mary Wollstonecraft, which precedes Woolf's, exemplifies the history of women's subjugation by the patriarchal system. In *A Room of One's Own*, Woolf sketches a fictional character of Judith, Shakespeare's sister – a genius woman whose imaginative powers are subdued by unfavorable life circumstances. Conjuring up Judith, Woolf (re)creates a space for women artists to stand up against the deeply rooted gender conventions which belittle or disregard feminine

capability of creation. She encourages women to transcend their lack of confidence, to oppose a disbelief in their relevance, and to heighten trust in the irreplaceability of their voice in society.

Hui, Ka-yu (Boston College, USA)

When violence speaks: Hannah Arendt and the narrative transformation of violence

Hannah Arendt's reflection on political violence is as controversial as it is ceremonial. Her sharp distinction between power and violence, and her claim that violence is a-political (or even anti-political) continue to generate heated debates. While a lot has already been written on this topic, most discussions in the scholarship gravitate around whether or not Arendt's distinction is tenable. This paper takes up the problem from a different perspective. Rather than shattering the Arendtian distinction and arguing that violence per se is, or can be, political, this paper defends the distinction and proceeds to ask how violence can be made political. According to the thesis this paper defends, through narrative, violence can "speak" through the mouth of the narrator. Through narratives, mute violence is transformed into meaningful political actions.

This paper is divided into five parts. First, we begin with a brief examination of the current scholarship on Arendt's conception of violence. Second, we defend that Arendt's distinction between power and violence is phenomenological. The aim of the distinction is to secure a peculiar form of political experience which cannot be obtained through violence. Third, we discuss the relations between action, speech and violence, arguing that violence is a-political because it is silent. In other words, violence does not reveal a Who and does not contribute to the constitution of a space of freedom. Fourth, we survey the various discussions on narrative in Arendt, arguing that narrative for Arendt has three principle functions: immortalization, redemption, and revelation. Fifth, we argue that even though the revealing function remains underdeveloped theoretically, it is employed implicitly in Arendt's concrete narrative works, and that this revealing function of narrative can transform violence into meaningful political actions in a peculiar sense. Narrated violence reveals its actor, and can become meaningful principles (principium) for the actions of others.

Ilkay, Hilary (University of King's College, Canada)

Diotima's Renaissance: Rediscovery, Reception, Rewriting

The paper I hope to present at the New Voices conference is an adaptation of my MA thesis that I have been developing for publication. My research project traces the historical reception of Diotima, the woman Socrates names as his teacher in eros in Plato's *Symposium*, with the aim of understanding how the interpretation that she is a fictional character arose. In the *History of Women Philosophers*, Mary Ellen Waithe condemns the Renaissance humanist Marsilio Ficino as the misogynist originator of this line of thinking; however, I have found no such sentiment in Ficino's Latin commentary on

his translation of the *Symposium* and have recovered earlier sources engaged in what I call the “Diotima debate.” In fact, I argue, contrary to Waithe, that Ficino’s reading of Diotima as a wise, Sibylline figure ushered in a renaissance for Diotima that allowed her to be celebrated by other male humanists and, importantly, to be reclaimed and reimagined by women thinkers of the 15th to 17th centuries, including the likes of Tullia d’Aragona. Cited as a philosopher in her own right and the teacher of the wisest man in history, Diotima served as an aspirational figure for educated women who wanted to prove their intellectual merits. She also served as a common reference point for male humanists who wanted to praise their learned women contemporaries. Francesco Patrizi, for example, called the virtuosa Tarquinia Molza “*nuova Diotima*” [“a new Diotima”] in his 1577 work written in praise of her, *L’amorosa filosofia*. In my paper, I will rewrite the narrative presented by Waithe to suggest that Ficino’s interpretation of Diotima did not condemn her to be erased from history, but in fact restored her to life as a model of wisdom as part of his project of syncretizing between ancient Greek learning and Christian principles.

Itokazu, Anastasia Guidi (Federal University of ABC, Brazil)

An ontology for the Anthropocene? Anne Conway’s vitalist conception of matter and the dancing spirits in the forest

Native Brazilian thinkers, such as Yanomami *xamã* Davi Kopenawa, have shown how contemporary mechanistic Western conceptions of matter as “dead” have led to the accelerated destruction of the biosphere and, in particular, of the Amazon rainforest. In the first part of this talk, I discuss Anne Conway’s arguments against both Descartes’s dualism and Thomas Hobbes materialism in her posthumously published book *The Principles of the Most Ancient and Modern Philosophy*. Conway does not accept any essential division between body and spirit, nor does she believe mental states can be adequately described in materialistic terms; taking an opposite direction, she posits that matter is inherently spiritual and directed towards an ever greater good. Then, in the second part, I present a few glimpses of the Yanomami ontology described in Kopenawa’s *The falling sky* in order to show how Conway’s critiques, as well as her own very original ontological views, provide a fresh perspective on Modern Western philosophy which is suitable for potentializing the much needed dialogue between Western and Native Brazilian philosophies, thus contributing to the massive task at hand of redirecting science from nature reckless exploitation to the conservation and restoration of life on Earth.

Katzav, Joel (University of Queensland, Australia)

Grace A. de Laguna's critique of analytic philosophy

Grace Mead Andrus de Laguna was a philosopher of exceptional originality who lived in the United States of America during the period 1878-1978. Many of the arguments and positions she developed during the early decades of the twentieth century later came to be central to the development of analytic philosophy. These arguments and positions included, even before 1930, a critique of the analytic-synthetic distinction, a private language argument, a use theory of meaning, a critique of type physicalism, a functionalist theory of mind, a critique of internalism about mental content, a critique of reductionism in science, a methodology of research programs in science and more. Nevertheless, de Laguna identified herself as a defender of the speculative vision of philosophy, a vision which, as she states, analytic philosophy opposed. I present her speculative vision of philosophy as well as some of the main ways in which she found analytic philosophy to be wanting. I also outline one of her main arguments against analytic philosophy, specifically her argument against the view that key parts of established opinion, e.g., common sense or science, should be assumed to be true at the outset of philosophical inquiry. I, further, briefly consider how her argument bears on the methodological views of George E. Moore and Bertrand Russell, and on logical empiricism. Finally, I note the applicability of her critique of analytic philosophy to important strands in recent analytic metaphysics, including to the Quinean approach to ontology, according to which we uncover our ontological commitments by examining what our best scientific theories quantify over, and to truthmaker theory, according to which metaphysics aims to uncover what makes our true statements true.

Kolomeitseva, Tatiana (Moscow, Russia)

A Dialogue Through the Century: Reception of Ernst Kunik's Historical Views in "The Expulsion of the Normans from Russian History" by Natalia Ilyina (Vokach)

The names of Natalia Ilyina (Vokach) and Ernst Kunik are rather exotic for Russian historiography. Natalia Ilyina (Vokach) has the title of a wife of Russian philosopher Ivan Ilyin from the XX century. Ernst Kunik has the fame of a German historian from the XIX century who left a poorly understood linguistic research. Meanwhile, apart from their obscurity to the general public, they are united by their scientific interest in the calling of the Varangians to the Russian land in the 9th century. Natalia Ilyina (Vokach) quoted Ernst Kunik in her book "The Expulsion of the Normans from Russian History" and reflected on the changes of his scientific views.

The focus of attention of Natalia Ilyina and Ernst Kunik is the "Varangian question", which is very controversial for historiography. The theme of Normanism and anti-Normanism is well developed in

Russian and world historiography. The Varangians in Russian history has long balanced between truth and fiction. A few words from Nestor's Chronicle turned to different realities behind the word "Varangs".

The book "The Expulsion of the Normans from Russian History" was published by Natalia Ilyina (Vokach) in the middle of the XX century. The talk shows her approach to historiography and her understanding of history as parts of the world intellectual process of reinventing the way of historical thinking in the XX century. Her reception of Ernst Kunik helps to observe how Natalia Ilyina (Vokach) redefines the methodology of Russian historiography.

In this talk we use Frank Ankersmit's methodology of "History and Tropology: The Rise and Fall of Metaphor" to analyze the reception of Ernst Kunik's writings by Natalia Ilyina (Vokach). The interest in the relationship between language, reality, and historical narratives is characteristic of Frank Ankersmit's philosophy of history. Frank Ankersmit divides reality, language and narrative proposals. Language can develop the understanding of reality and a narrative proposal: studying the language we work with the reality and can change a narrative proposal. That was clearly what both Ernst Kunik and Natalia Ilyina (Vokach) did: they focused on language and attempted to create the reality of the past.

We try to connect the fate of two historians and the theme of the fate of Russia, which they discussed, and thus focus on how and why the concept of the meaning of Russian history became the key problem for historians. Consequently, our article is devoted to historiography and the methodology of the philosophy of Russian history. The talk aims at thinking of Russian historiography in the terms of philosophy of history in order to question: "Why do we remember some historians and forget others? How does historiography in Russia contribute to the world's narratives? How and by whom has Russian history been created?"

Korpershoek, Maaïke (University of Groningen, Netherlands

Émilie du Châtelet's Idealism on Substance and Body

Émilie du Châtelet's *Foundations of Physics* (1740) has often been seen as an attempt at reconciling Leibnizian metaphysics with Newtonian physics. According to some commentators (Stan 2018; Jacobs 2020), however, Du Châtelet's metaphysics is a variety of Wolffian realism rather than Leibnizian idealism. I provide a new reading of Du Châtelet's matter theory and argue that (1) Du Châtelet was an idealist about substance and body, but that (2) her account of idealism does not imply phenomenalism.

According to Du Châtelet, the only real substances are monads (*simple beings*). Stan and Jacobs argue that Du Châtelet was a *realist* about simple beings in the – according to them – Wolffian sense that

they are physical, capable of interaction, and without representational capacities. If this interpretation were correct, Du Châtelet should indeed be regarded as a defender of substance realism. I argue, however, that Du Châtelet's *Foundations* provides substantial textual evidence in favour of the claim that simple beings are mind-like entities, which, like Leibniz's monads, possess representational capacities and are not capable of genuine causal interaction. This reading classifies Du Châtelet as a substance idealist. What are the implications of Du Châtelet's substance idealism for the ontological status of physical bodies? If bodies are composed of simple beings, and if simple beings are ideal substances, are extended bodies then also ideal? I argue that Du Châtelet's idealism about substance and bodies does not imply phenomenalism: bodies are not mere phenomena but possess external reality. Building on the argument of Rutherford (1990) concerning the reality of body in Leibniz, I claim that bodies are aggregates of simple beings and that the reality of bodies is guaranteed by the existence and reality of the simple beings. I suggest, contra Stan and Jacobs, that Du Châtelet's doctrine of the reality of body is very Leibnizian.

Kovács, Eszter (NKE Budapest, Hungary)

The Hidden Legacy of Émilie Du Châtelet's Conception of Freedom

Émilie Du Châtelet's conception of freedom has been studied by several scholars in recent years. Ruth Hagenhuber and Julia Jorati dedicated an article to this subject, Véronique Le Ru and Anne-Lise Rey treated this question as part of a wider study of Du Châtelet's metaphysics. Katarina Peixoto is currently working on this topic. Du Châtelet's influence on a dozen of physical and metaphysical articles of the *Encyclopédie* is also known. Koffi Maglo, in an article published in 2008, identified seven articles which mentioned the *Foundations of Physics* and their author. Some ten years later, Glenn Roe discovered further articles which had borrowed from the *Foundations*.

In my talk, I aim to focus on a different aspect of this question: I will analyse more specifically the posterity of Du Châtelet's conception of freedom during the decades after her death, pointing out further elements that do not figure in the articles by Maglo and Roe.

We can call it a hidden reception ("*une postérité souterraine*" in the words of Véronique Le Ru) since Du Châtelet had been forgotten until a relatively recent scholarly rediscovery and the authors who used her works in the 18th century rarely referred to her. Three points turn out to be important for this study. First, the posterity of her arguments for free human agency, which appear in the article LIBERTÉ of the *Encyclopédie* (written by Claude Yvon, preceded by four columns written by Jacques André Naigeon), even though these arguments were believed to have been elaborated only by Voltaire. Secondly, her definition of freedom as a divine attribute and its reappearance in another article of the *Encyclopédie*, DIEU (GOD). Finally, one can legitimately ask whether Diderot and

D'Alembert knew her conception of freedom; more precisely, whether they used her works when they examined Leibniz's thought. The article FORTUIT (ACCIDENTAL) by D'Alembert can be of concern for this point.

Lazella, Andrew (The University of Scranton, USA)

**What becomes of Bucephalus?: Anne Conway on The Plasticity of Nature, Ranterism, and
Divine Justice**

Anne Conway's *The Principles of the Most Ancient and Modern Philosophy* offers a fascinating account of the plasticity of nature. Consider the case of Alexander's horse, Bucephalus. An individual cannot become another individual of the same species, let alone another individual of another species: Bucephalus cannot become Brunella nor can he become Alexander. But Bucephalus *as Bucephalus* can become a human being or a worm. This is because of the fluidity between species; in fact, the difference between so-called species of creatures is only a matter of degree and a degree of matter. Without this perfectibility, there could be no divine justice in the world. Perhaps the operative term here is "in." That is, Conway's Quaker-Kabbalistic materialism, which like her Cambridge Platonist peers opposes the Calvinistic economy of salvation-damnation, comes dangerously close to Ranterism: salvation can occur *in* the world and need not wait until some otherworldly beyond. The shared soil in which both Ranterism and Quakerism grew required that Conway separated her views from the former's (alleged or real) pantheism, antinomianism, and general licentiousness. For example, Conway's view of nature as "one mother" of which creatures are parts and the universal sympathy between these parts more than echoes the Ranter salutation, "my one flesh," and the philosophy surrounding it. Given the radical plasticity of nature, Conway needs some mechanism to track Bucephalus and other such individuals amidst change and throughout time. She will not (as Leibniz does at certain points) retreat to the scholastic doctrine of substantial forms because this would lock individuals into a species of a certain kind: Bucephalus would always be a horse. Identifying individuals with their soul or spirit, however, would betray her basic materialist insights and also render simple that which she argues is an inherent multiplicity. She finds her answer in the notion of virtually-extended multiplicities, which, I argue, entails a version of haecceitism.

Lennie, Tyra (McMaster University, Canada)

Marinella's Reclamation of Dress and Outward Beauty

In *The Nobility and Excellence of Women and the Defects and Vices of Men* (1600), Italian philosopher and poet Lucrezia Marinella asserts that "compared to women, all men are ugly."¹ Throughout her work, Marinella argues that women are intellectually and morally superior to men in response to the constant rehearsal of women's defects in the philosophical canon at the time. An

essential pillar of her work rests on the assertion that outward beauty is an indication of inward virtue and excellence shining through. Through this argument, Marinella reclaims women's beauty as a sign of virtue rather than one of mere vanity. In this paper, I begin with a brief background on Marinella's personal and educational pursuits. In section two, I compare the ways in which Marinella discusses women and men when it comes to beauty and grooming. In section three, I situate these discussions within her more extensive project and diminish the charge that her work supports the beautification of women. In section four, I defend Marinella's work from the philosophical aversion to fashion. Finally, I draw connections between Marinella's thoughts about embodiment and dress in relation to queer fashion. Ultimately, I will show how Marinella's arguments anticipate contemporary discussions about the male gaze, self-love, and the power and importance of dress and presentation for queer community members. The resulting aim of this paper is twofold: to showcase the historical significance of Marinella's *Nobility* in the long tradition of philosophical work about beauty and to pull contemporary insights from her theory.

Matthews, Margaret (Villanova University, USA)

Marie de Gournay's use of Skeptical Strategies

This paper offers a new interpretation of Marie de Gournay's use of skeptical strategies in the *Equality of Men and Women* in light of her discussion of prejudice in *The Ladies' Complaint*. Readers of Gournay's *Equality of Men and Women* have often been puzzled by an apparent tension in her methodology. On the one hand, Gournay suggests that she will prove the equality of men and women by means of arguments; on the other hand, she suggests that she can only establish her conclusion through appeal to theological authority. Eileen O'Neill offers one influential solution to this puzzle, interpreting Gournay as a Pyrrhonian skeptic and a Catholic fideist. In this interpretation, Gournay's arguments are equipollent arguments aimed at showing the inability of reason to settle the equality question, and her appeals to theological authority are based on a fideistic understanding of the relation between faith and reason. In this paper, I will argue instead that Gournay is not a skeptic regarding the power of reason, and that her appeals to theological authority are not a response to the fideistic conclusion that the equality thesis is accessible through faith and faith alone. Instead, I will show that Gournay's adoption of skeptical strategies can be better understood considering her analysis of prejudice in her other feminist work, *the Ladies' Complaint*. Concretely, I will show that the problem to which Gournay's use of skeptical arguments responds is less an epistemological problem, and more of a social one.

Philosophy of Maria Gołaszewska (1926-2015) and Her Theory of Aesthetic Situation

In the history of Poland, very few women have occupied themselves with philosophy, and even fewer have made a lasting and significant contribution to both national and global philosophy. One unusual and heretofore unappreciated exception is represented by the person and academic achievements of the philosopher Maria Gołaszewska. She was associated throughout her life with Poland's oldest academic institution, the Jagiellonian University in Cracow, where she earned all of her degrees under the direction of the phenomenologist Roman Ingarden, himself a student of Edmund Husserl.

Gołaszewska was an outstanding and important figure, not only in Polish and global philosophy, but also in the Polish academic world in general. During the post-war and communist years in Poland Gołaszewska conducted research focusing on issues related to art and aesthetics. While she made reference to the phenomenological findings of Ingarden and Husserl, as well as to existentialism and structuralism, her research extended beyond formal and theoretical descriptions of art and experience thereof. Gołaszewska created her own conception of aesthetically and anthropologically oriented aesthetics, taking empirical methods into account. The essential and best-known element of Gołaszewska's philosophy is the concept of the aesthetic situation, which she derived from phenomenology, structuralism, and the existentialism of Jean-Paul Sartre.

The aim of my paper is to present Gołaszewska's phenomenological thought, with particular emphasis on her theory of aesthetic situation. This theory is a proposal for a comprehensive approach to the aesthetic attitude of a human being towards reality and serves to describe not only the components of the aesthetic situation but also the relationships between them. This theory is linked to the methodological postulate of the practice of empirically oriented aesthetics, that is, the resultant of axiology and directly acquired empirical facts. Thus understood aesthetic theory possesses an interdisciplinary character, based on the results of research in other empirical disciplines, such as sociology, psychology, art theory and history, and cultural theory.

Gołaszewska's thought can also be described as inclusive, transgressive, and transformative, and thus finds a place with the area of research indicated by the feminist perspective in philosophy. Her multifaceted description of the aesthetic situation and related aesthetic experiences is a prime example of a theory that accounts for the perspective of gender, and in this sense should be acknowledged as an important contribution to contemporary gender-sensitive philosophy. In my paper, I will present Gołaszewska's conception as a cognitively valuable response to the search of feminist aesthetics for a suitable description of women's experiences related to art and aesthetic perception.

Neumann, Daniel (University of Klagenfurt, Austria)

The social experience. Gerda Walther's psychology of community

In her „Zur Ontologie der sozialen Gemeinschaften“ (1923), Gerda Walther sets out to analyze the ontological, not the phenomenological nature of community. In other words, her method does not begin from the question of how a community appears in consciousness, but what constitutes the real being of communities. In approaching this historically under-appreciated text, I want to specifically focus on what sets Walther's account of sociality apart from Husserl's, which is the notion of a psychological, rather than transcendental or phenomenological “I”.

Whereas Husserl's investigation starts with the question: how does the other appear to me as immediately perceived, Walther is more interested in how others always already shape those experiences of immediacy which Husserl focusses on. By embedding the “I” in a “self” which comprises past memories and feelings that have become habitual like long friendships or animosities, social phenomena arise out of a complex personal and psychological history. This is of central importance for the discussion of communities as it allows Walther to conceptualize communal interests and bonds not just via intentional objects but through reciprocal affective implication. For Walther, the Copernican Revolution in sociology consists in recognizing how the different modalities of connectedness (Einigung) shape our experience, making questionable the sufficiency of the standard phenomenological approach to sociality via intentional analysis.

In my talk, I want to firstly present Walther's approach to sociality, with her description of the embeddedness of immediate experience in the social feelings that have become part of the self as the focal point. Secondly, to gain a better sense of Walther's historical place at the intersection of phenomenology, psychology and sociology I want to briefly sketch how her account differs from that of Husserl and how it is indebted to, but goes beyond the psychology of emotions of her Munich teacher Alexander Pfänder, specifically as laid out in his “Zur Psychologie der Gesinnungen” (1913/16).

Robson, Ellie (Birkbeck, University of London, UK)

Taking Midgley seriously: A case for Mary Midgley's inclusion in histories of contemporary philosophy

The philosophy of Mary Midgley has been scarcely recognised within academic philosophy. Beyond scattered reference to her book *Animals and Why They Matter* (1984) – a respected contribution to the Animal Ethics debates of the 1980s – Midgley's impressive body of work has largely been sidelined as not ‘proper’ philosophy. Given that Midgley is now a philosopher of the past (1919-2018) it is the job of historians of philosophy to address and combat this neglect. In this talk I will interrogate

whether the various barriers and biasing factors facing Midgley, a so-called ‘minor’ philosopher, present justifiable reasons for her continued exclusion from the history of philosophy, today (Hutton, 2014). This interrogation is particularly pertinent to contextualising contributions of Midgley as a woman philosopher who has historically faced implicit and explicit sexism on an institutional basis. I will consider how and to what extent the style, content, and form of Midgley’s philosophy has fallen out of the purview of academic philosophy leading it to be overlooked. Challenging the various reasons for her oversight lends credence to my claim that Midgley’s neglect was due not to the calibre of her philosophy, but rather a convergence of contextual factors of her situation. Establishing such a claim will disavow certain assertions and assumptions, both historic and contemporary, that Midgley something of a public intellect, rather than an academic philosopher (she may, after all, be both).

Nguyen, Jen (Harvard University, USA)

A True Friend Stabs You in the Front: Astell’s Admonisher Conception of Friendship

On what I call the admonisher conception of friendship, the defining activity of friendship is admonishing for the sake of improvement. The goal of this paper is to develop and defend the admonisher conception of friendship as a reading of Astell. For despite the growing interest in Astell’s stance on friendship, there is still no systematic treatment of her admonisher conception of friendship, a lack which becomes more puzzling given how frequently that conception appears in Astell’s corpus. Furthermore, there remains no clear consensus about what friendship amounts to for Astell, with one commentator even suggesting that there are “tensions” in Astell’s theorizing. By contrast, I argue that Astell’s texts paint one coherent, clear and well-motivated picture of friendship—the admonisher conception of friendship. The paper is divided into three sections. The first presents a textual case for thinking that Astell accepts the admonisher conception of friendship. The second section analyzes Astell’s claim that such friendships bring about epistemic goods, while the third and final section teases out Astell’s even stronger claim that there is a deep sense in which *only* friendship can deliver such goods.

Nilsen, Frederik (UiT, The Arctic University of Norway)

Anne Conway and the revitalization of nature: Conway's environmental ethics as an alternative to Aristotle and Spinoza

In the ecofeminist classic *The Death of Nature: Women, Ecology and the Scientific Revolution* (1980), Carolyn Merchant highlights the way Anne Conway (1631-79) criticize the dominant mechanistic view of nature by claiming that everything in nature consist of monads filled with life. In Conway's work *Principles of the most Ancient and Modern Philosophy* we find a view of nature where the inorganic nature, such as earth, stones, and mountains, has life and therefore needs to be treated in a good way. We try to show that Conway's position falls between Aristotle's and Spinoza's, since she, on the one hand, agrees with Spinoza that the whole of nature has life, whereas she, on the other hand, operates, as Aristotle, with a hierarchy in the creation between humans, animals, plants, and stones. Conway has thus been significant for the emergence of an environmental ethics that differs from both duty ethics and utilitarianism, and at the same time represents an alternative for the dominant dualistic view of nature. Nevertheless, it is contentious how the ecofeminism should relate to Conway's hierarchical thinking, since environmental philosophy in general, and ecofeminism in particular, have been concerned with the breaking from anthropocentric premises.

Pal, Sulagna (University of Delhi, India)

Objectification of the Environment and the Female Body

This paper is based on my understanding and analysis of a number of ideas related to the body with the sole intention of over viewing the diverse understanding of the body and its functioning comparing it with the ways of treating the environment as an object. Both the ways of treatment may be related as both environment and the female body are treated as *objects* meant for fixed purposes nothing beyond that. This objectification of human body on one hand and the environment on the other is problematic sidelining the real value borne by each extending the meaning of the term *objectification*.

Buddhaghosa's (who is a Buddhist scholar) understanding of the body seems to be negative to many. I have viewed the body from the perspective of Buddhaghosa within his work *The Path of Purification*. Buddhaghosa points out the reality of the body and its underlying foulness and the human tendency to camouflage its foulness under the veil of superficial make up, which are altogether temporary by nature. I will be dealing with the understanding of the body viewed from the perspective of the feminists in order to develop an overall understanding of the term "body". I will make an effort to re-reflect upon Buddhaghosa's understanding of the body, which seems to have an essence of the "gendered" notion within itself. On the other hand the aim of environmental ethics has always been

to identify the missing “key” in human life, one might say it’s the forgotten duty & devotion towards the environment. There have been few methods used in the past to awaken the conscience of humans. I will be analyzing some of these methods in order to estimate some of the ways of approaching environmental problems. Considering the modern development in the world around us, there has been significant development in behavioral sciences, which leads us to alternatives which we can implement towards changing people’s underlying understanding regarding the environment. These methods are beginnings of changes in attitudes towards environmental ethical disbalances.

Peixoto, Katarina (UERJ, Brazil)

Émilie Du Châtelet’s theory of freedom: searching a bridge in the midst

In her 1737 essay “On Freedom”, Émilie Du Châtelet presents a theory of action that separates the will from freedom. For her, the will is a function of the understanding (On Freedom, 492§2) and, like this, a passion; both would be passive. She argues that the will does not influence the power of self-movement in which freedom consists (On Freedom, 493§4). Then, Du Châtelet states: “The will is never the cause of our actions, even though it is their occasion; for an abstract notion cannot have any physical influence over the physical self-moving power”. A passion could never bring about actions, since “there is no connection between that which is passive and that which is active” (492§2). Thus, the power of self-movement cannot have an efficient cause, and the will is separated from the action.

A consequence of this distinction would then be that acting freely would have nothing to do with wanting something, and wanting something or judging something better would not determine the freedom in action. The nature of the connection between will and freedom is therefore problematic. In her brilliant paper on Du Châtelet’s theory of freedom, Julia Jorati (2019) emphasizes the way by which the philosopher uses the concept of “occasional causation”, in order to fill the gap between will and freedom. Jorati explores rather a reason than an efficient cause and finds a metaphysical way by which the relationship between will and action would make sense. Free actions would be voluntary and the will would be implied in freedom according to a “moral necessity”, occasionally binding the action. Still, it seems that the nature of this “moral necessity” remains somewhat in the midst. If that is the case, what would be the bridge to be found?

Peterson, Mary (University of Hamburg, Germany)

Apricot Bonbons to a Free Man: Lispector and Spinoza

The influence of Baruch Spinoza on Brazilian novelist Clarice Lispector has been well-documented by commentators and critics, especially regarding mystical themes in Lispector’s fiction. However, little

scholarly work on Lispector assumes that she offers a philosophical challenge to Spinoza's views. By contrast, in this paper, I argue that Lispector gives a critical reading of Spinoza in *Near to the Wild Heart* and "Letters to Hermengardo." Using those two texts, I reconstruct a critique of Spinoza's notion of the free man. In the *Ethics* Book IV, Spinoza presents an ideal human being who is governed by reason and therefore free. Through the character of Otávio in *Near to the Wild Heart*, and further elaboration on the hero in "Letters to Hermengardo" Lispector shows a blind spot in Spinoza's theory: the ideal human being, or free man, cannot escape being perceived by other people. In one scene, Otávio writes a paper about various metaphysical themes in Spinoza's *Ethics*, especially freedom. Crucially, Otávio misconstrues Spinoza's free man as a hero, and freedom as greatness. The great man, Otávio gathers from Spinoza, "tries to summarize, evaluate and establish principles and laws for his life." Otávio thinks himself to be a great man, but is tormented by fears that his wife and mistress perceive him as insubstantial. In the same scene, Otávio breaks from writing to take a walk and buy a bag of apricot bonbons. "Who said great men don't eat bonbons?" he asks. "Except that in biographies no one remembers to mention it. What if Joana knew about this thought of his?" He grows angry and throws the bonbons in the gutter. Otávio is not free in such moments of anxious reflection. Lispector's challenge to Spinoza is that the free man ideal must incorporate a healthy relationship to other people's perceptions.

Pontes, Yasmin (Graduanda UFRJ, Brazil) & Pugliese, Nastassja (UFRJ, Brazil)

Analysing two anonymous publications on 19th century newspapers: is Nisia Floresta the author?

Nisia Floresta has long been and continues to be considered the forerunner of women's emancipation, and her early works are founding texts of both Brazilian and Latin American feminism more widely. On this paper we will analyse the case of two anonymous publications which appeared in the Brazilian press that are attributed to Nisia Floresta. The purpose of this work is twofold: to show the importance of philosophy publications in newspapers and periodicals made by women throughout the 19th century in Brazil and to discuss problems associated with it such as the practice of anonymous publishing.

It is a fact that the press aimed at women sought their wide insertion in society, either through the defense of education aimed at the formation of a critical sense, or through the dissemination of their writings. In Brazil, the press aimed at the female audience appeared only in the 19th century, with newspapers intended for women, spreading philosophical ideas on women's rights- such as, for example, the *Espelho Diamantino*. Nisia Floresta was a great pioneer women writer in the Brazilian press, as attests the history of the book *Opúsculo Humanitário* (1853) which was initially published as essays in newspapers. Although Nisia did not sign these essays when they were first published, the authorship could be proven because they were turned into a book in 1853.

However, the same does not happen with other texts that are attributed to her - such as those published in the newspaper *Espelho Diamantino* - where some biographers assume that Nísia Floresta collaborated in some editions. The Brazilian society of the 19th century was highly sexist, so it is likely that women were afraid of having their names linked to texts that would be considered progressive. Although their ideas were rapidly spread through the press, their choice for anonymous publishing generated difficulties for scholars. In *História de Nísia Floresta* (1941), Adauto da Câmara credits Floresta with two texts published anonymously in the press: "A educação moral da mulher" [The moral education of women] and "A educação do homem" [The education of men]. Nevertheless, there is no other biography or secondary literature attributing them to Floresta. These texts do not appear in lists of her complete works. There is, however, a chance that da Câmara is right and that these are Floresta's texts that have never been thoroughly studied. On this work, we will analyse these texts, extracting and transcribing them from facsimiles from 19th-century Brazilian newspapers where they have been first published, in order to map the arguments of these works and compare them with other theses present in publications signed by Floresta, in order to prove, or disprove, her authorship.

Rodríguez, Teresa (Autonomous National University, Mexico)

Historiographical Pluralism and Anne Conway's Principia

If, as Mercer says, twentieth-century scholars had to begin their textual analysis of Conway's *Principia ex nihilo*, by 2022 philosophical historiography has done an important job of interpretation. In a brief review, four preponderant historiographical models can be pointed out: the "coat-tail ride" model (for example, the proto-Leibniz model); the "Modern model" (for example, the studies that relate Conway to Spinoza, Descartes, etc.); the "Platonist" model (which relates Conway to the school of the Cambridge Platonists, sometimes including her in it) and the "Theological" model (which focuses on an onto-theology or a physical-theology, tending towards mysticism). Against them, a fifth model can be established: The "historiographical" model which includes several lines of research, for example, the contextualist line (Hutton's intellectual biography and Platas' historiographical justification). In this paper, I will present another line of this model, which I call "eclectic" (linking Conway's philosophy with previous traditions based on the notion of *prisca theologia*) and I will argue that, in order to understand Conway's philosophy, it is necessary to implement pluralistic strategies related to this fifth model.

Sample, Hope (Grand Valley State University, USA)

Anne Conway on Divine and Creaturely Freedom

This paper proposes a novel interpretation of Conway's account of freedom. Conway's *The Principles of the Most Ancient and Modern Philosophy* leaves us a puzzle concerning how to understand her account of freedom in created things, or creatures in her terminology, as her only explicit remarks concern divine freedom. God acts for the right reasons and could not have done otherwise due to his wisdom and goodness. Creatures, by contrast, make mistakes. Conway's position is that it is the essence of creatures to be mutable with respect to the good: they have the power to choose evil. She describes their power to do evil as indifference of will. God's freedom is apparently defined by necessity and permanence, while creaturely freedom is characterized by contingency and flux. A dual interpretation of freedom according to which divine freedom is defined by divine justice, while creaturely freedom is indifference, has been the dominant approach in the scholarship on Conway's philosophy. However, I defend an alternative interpretative proposal that can combine the apparently contrary features of divine and creaturely agency within a single account of freedom: a univocal account of freedom as spontaneity, an intrinsic power for perfection.

For Conway, spontaneity is a power to cause one's actions independent of external forces, and it is also a value-laden power, a power for transmitting divine perfection. The latter is a unique aspect of Conway's account of spontaneity. An intrinsic power for perfection is compatible with necessitation to perfection, but it is incompatible with necessitated imperfection. Although creaturely errors are inevitable, their mistakes are freely chosen if it was possible for them to do good. In sum, spontaneity can combine what initially seemed to be incompatible characteristics of necessity and contingency into a single account of freedom.

Sample, Hope (Grand Valley State University, USA) & Wang, Hwa Yeong (Georgetown University, USA)

The Grounds of Moral Equality in Im Yunjidang and Anne Conway

Im Yunjidang argued for the moral equality of women in 18th century Korea. In 17th century England, Anne Conway defended a radical egalitarian picture according to which everything can achieve a level of virtue sufficient for salvation. Though their contexts and aims are different, both present explicit grounds for moral equality deriving from the essence of living things. This comparative work will also highlight, however, their differences on the grounds that lead one to sagehood, in one case, and universal salvation, on the other. For Yunjidang, what matters is the process of becoming a sage and perseverance and hard work that enables one to more closely approach sagehood. Conway, by contrast, has an outcome-oriented picture of the processes of moral development: every life process

will culminate in a level of virtue sufficient for salvation. Overall, this comparative study aims to clarify and distinguish distinctive elements of their approaches to moral equality and identify common concerns that unite their inquiry.

Seixas da Silva, Mitieli (UFSM, Brazil)

Analysis and mathematics in the method of the Commentary to the Du Châtelet's translation of Newton's Principia

The historical and scientific value of the *Principia's* translation by Du Châtelet is indisputable. But what makes Du Châtelet's *Commentaire* a work which deserves to be studied philosophically? In the entry "Newtonianisme" from the *Encyclopédie* (1751-1772), D'Alembert refers to the *Commentaire* as one of the works responsible for making Newton accessible to a wider audience. But is it true that the *Commentaire* is a work written for the lay public? In fact, its first part, an *Exposition abrégée du Système du Monde*, contains an *Introduction* to scientific advances in astronomy up to Newton, as well as an exposition of how Newton's theory explains phenomena such as the movement of the stars, the ebb and flow of tides, the orbit of comets, the flattening of the Earth at the poles etc. In this first *Exposition* we also find some Du Châtelet's ideas on philosophy of science and epistemology. In addition to this, however, Du Châtelet offers a Section entitled *Solution Analytique*, in which she tackles problems derived from Newtonian theory using one of the most sophisticated techniques of mathematics of her time, namely, the integral calculus. There is not in the scientific popularization literature of the time something similar to what was done by the marquise. In this part of the *Commentaire*, therefore, we are dealing with something unprecedented. But why does Du Châtelet considers it pertinent, and even necessary, to offer an *analytical* solution? Analysis is, according the *Encyclopédie*, the method of solving mathematical problems by reducing them to equations. My hypothesis is that understanding the specific role of analysis and, consequently, mathematics, in the structure of Du Châtelet's *Commentary* can illuminate the way she sees the scientific method and, that being the case, reinforce her philosophical influence.

Severini, Piergiacomo (Università G. d'Annunzio di Chieti-Pescara, Italy)

Jeanne Hersch's philosophical turn to responsible freedom. What rights need to be human

Jeanne Hersch spent her whole life trying to enlighten human dignity and how to increase possibilities of freedom. First of all, she reflected on freedom from a theoretical point of view, deepening its role in human existence. In the second half of her life, after having elaborated a theoretical system, she tried to state the real conditions for preserving and enhancing freedom, committing herself to promote freedom in her specific time. The aim of this talk is to present some consistent passages of Hersch's

reflection on freedom, in order to point out some original aspects, which should be taken into account when theoretically reasoning on human rights. Jeanne Hersch was at the head of the Division of Philosophy of UNESCO between 1966 and 1968, but her writings on politics and human rights are almost all unavailable in English. This talk should introduce her thought, with a focus on the political and intersubjective part.

The talk consists of three parts. In the first part, I present Hersch's metaphilosophical and ontological investigation, leading to the definition of *inner freedom*, which every human being uses in order to decide and incarnate her/his existence. In the second part, I analyse Hersch's contributions on politics and human rights, which should enhance inner freedom, guaranteeing *outer conditions of liberty*. Even if a path that is founded in freedom cannot give positive content prescriptions, this second part offers some formal indications about the enhancement of freedom at an intersubjective level and leads to *responsible freedom* as a responsible inner freedom that respects the other's inner freedom. In the third part, I highlight some relevant points in Hersch's reflection that could help in preventing a *naïve* approach to human rights.

Shields, Matthew (University College Dublin, Ireland)

Alice Ambrose and the History of Analytic Metaphilosophy

In the rapidly growing literature on conceptual engineering, a consensus has emerged regarding the history of this methodology in twentieth-century analytic philosophy. Philosophers almost unanimously agree that Rudolf Carnap's account of explication is the clear forerunner of contemporary discussions of conceptual engineering. In this paper, I argue that this history is too narrow and that an equal, if not better contender is the work of Alice Ambrose. Ambrose lays out a detailed set of metaphilosophical arguments for re-interpreting many central philosophical disputes as a series of proposed linguistic and conceptual revisions. Ambrose's metaphilosophical views have, however, been largely forgotten. In the many thousands of pages written on conceptual engineering in recent years, Ambrose's work, as far as I can tell, has not been cited once. When Ambrose is mentioned in contemporary contexts, it is almost exclusively in terms of her relationship to the influential men who were her teachers, Moore and Wittgenstein. I aim not only to restore Ambrose's rightful place at the center of any discussion of this history, but also encourage other philosophers working in this contemporary literature to engage with Ambrose's work, which is developed with a striking depth and scope. In the first section, I present Ambrose's general metaphilosophical views and compare them to the contemporary literature on conceptual engineering. In the second section, I show how Ambrose applies her metaphilosophical position to various philosophical disputes, including a reinterpretation of the epistemological skeptic as proposing a revision to our concept of

knowledge and of the platonist and nominalist in the philosophy of mathematics as proposing revisions to our concept of number. In the paper's third and final section, I address Roderick Chisholm's criticisms of Ambrose's metaphilosophical views and argue that the criticisms do not stand up to scrutiny.

Shukla, Richa (OP Jindal Global University, India)

Lost, found, or misplaced: tracing women's voices from the Hindu traditions.

Hindu Traditions have long been debated, critiqued, and dismissed. Debated and critiqued as that's one of the core scriptural Hindu values. Dismissed as it has been painted as a monolithic category which has nothing to offer apart from spiritualism and abstraction. Whether it's the Rig-Veda, The Ramayana and the Mahabharata all these can be considered as a valid carrier of Epistemology. Not because they give us a glimpse of who we used to be, where are we coming from but also because if we do a symptomatic reading of these texts, it gives us an idea of 'who can be a knower'? 'Who has been a knower/ subject'? This also happens because largely the interpretation of philosophy has been done by men or rather philosophy has been interpreted in a masculine manner. In the West, one can see a change in how Philosophy is getting projected now.

Despite of the fact that Philosophy has been considered as the mother of all disciplines, why its motherless in nature? There are multiple works in European Philosophy which tries to look for a reason behind this 'gender-gap' in Philosophy. But none in the Indian domain. This proposal would try to bring back these gendered philosophical voices from Indian traditions. The purpose would be to establish the presence of women's voices in Indian Philosophical Domain. Apart from Gargi, Kapila and Maitraye there are multiple philosophical voices of dissent, dialogue, and engagements like Lopa Mudra, Hurrām Khatun, Sita, Draupadi, Soorpanakha and Mirabai. This proposal would try to establish these narratives.

Sidzinska, Maja (University of Pennsylvania, USA)

Émilie du Châtelet's Mathematical Fictionalism

Émilie Du Châtelet was a fictionalist about mathematics. Mathematical fictionalism (henceforth, *fictionalism*) is the view that, strictly speaking, mathematical entities such as numbers, functions, and sets, are fictions that are useful for human purposes, but are not themselves real in a realist sense: neither are they real in the natural, physical sense, nor are they real in a platonist sense—they are not existent abstracta. In this work, I first explain fictionalism. Then I illustrate Du Châtelet's position with regard to mathematical entities and give textual evidence of her fictionalism from the *Institutions*

de Physique. I offer a sketch of the philosophical-scientific issues that would have motivated Du Châtelet's fictionalism: explaining the behavior of bodies, as well as the ontological extraneity of mathematical entities in her system, had they been taken to be real abstracta. I argue that Benacerraf's *epistemological problem*, which is the problem of articulating causal relations between mathematical entities and physical ones, is an analog of one of the problems Du Châtelet faced in trying to explain the behaviors of bodies. Since fictionalism solves Benacerraf's epistemological problem, it solves her problem as well, providing a motivation for its adoption. Finally, I argue that Du Châtelet's fictionalism was plausibly motivated by Leibniz's and other mathematicians' views who themselves held fictionalist positions with regard to certain mathematical issues. Although I project onto Du Châtelet a philosophical position which was not identified as such at the time of her writing, I do so with the aim of highlighting her systematicity and making sense of her priorities, as well as showing a link between historical and contemporary philosophical issues.

Skiba, Lukas (University of Hamburg, Germany)

Stebbing on Relations

While recent years have seen a steep increase of interest in the philosophy of Susan Stebbing, her work on the metaphysics of relations has so far received little to no attention. In particular, her 1916-17 article "Relations and Coherence", in which she engages with Russell's famous response to Bradley's infamous regress arguments against the intelligibility of relations, has so far been widely ignored. One reason for this, suggested by Janssen-Lauret (2017), may be the perception (found for instance in Chapman 2013) that, in this early work, Stebbing is still overly impressed with the pompous and dogmatic style of philosophy sometimes associated with British idealists and is yet to be converted to the 'more rigorous, analytic style' linked to their early analytic antagonists. Given this reputation of being shrouded in pre-analytic obscurity, it is surprising to find "Relations and Coherence", upon closer inspection, to contain not only some key *early* analytic insights but, in fact, some thoughts and arguments that have only gained substantial currency in *contemporary* analytic philosophy. Or so I shall argue. In particular, I suggest, firstly, that Stebbing reveals one of Russell's two Anti-Bradleyan arguments to rely on a tacit and unexplained notion of certain properties being, in an objective and context-independent sense, *essential* to their bearers. And, secondly, that Stebbing then goes on to criticize this tacit assumption in a way surprisingly in keeping with a contextual approach to essential properties found, some 70 years later, in the work of no less an arch analytic philosopher than David Lewis.

Ann Margaret Sharp (1942-2010) – co-founder, with Matthew Lipman, of the philosophical-educational proposal known as “Philosophy for Children” (P4C), which is now globally widespread – developed her own convictions about the relevance of philosophy and philosophical investigation to education in a unique socio-cultural environment (Catholic education, teaching in US Black Colleges, house parent to teenagers engaged in unconventional schooling). Since their providential meeting in 1973, Lipman and Sharp conceived of their joint educational P4C program, which culminated in the related educational curriculum consisting of philosophical stories and teacher manuals, now translated into many languages and disseminated all over the world. Both founders contributed to the success of the project: Lipman in organizational and managerial terms, Sharp in terms of teaching, teacher-training, and team building. Furthermore, both equally engaged in theoretical reflection on their educational experience, the result of which was a large series of academic and scientific works, published in journals and volumes. However, it must also be said that for a long time Sharp’s academic contribution failed to be adequately recognized, while only recently a reversal of trend has been noted. This omission is even more problematic if we consider that P4C’s development, effectiveness, and global dissemination largely benefited from Sharp’s theological, ethical, and ecological sensitivity, as well as from her relational capacities, her gender perspective, and her genuine philosophical interest in feminism.

Christine de Pizan on the Moral and Epistemic Harm of Misogyny and Slander

Christine de Pizan (1364 – c. 1430) is probably the first woman “to articulate a consistent evaluation of men’s views of women” (Prudence Allen, *The Concept of Woman: The Early Humanist Reformation 1259-1500*). Christine discusses how men slander and hold misogynistic representations of women especially at the beginning of her career in works such as *The God of Love’s Letter* (1399), *The Tale of Poissy* (1400), *The Tale of the Rose* (1402), the epistolary exchange about the Romance of the Rose (1401-1403), *The Book of the City of Ladies* (1405) and to a lesser extent in *The Treasure of the City of Ladies: The Book of Three Virtues* (1405). Many of these works discuss the representation of women in courtly literature, and some of them deal with issues related to the representation of women in the famous medieval poem, *Le roman de la rose*.

This paper considers Christine’s discussion of misogyny and slander in relation to her views about female and male virtues. In different works, Christine points out that misogyny and slander harm not only women but also men. Indeed, she even emphasizes that those who use slander suffer greater

harm than the ones who are slandered. I argue that Christine recognizes that misogyny and slander cause different kinds of moral and epistemic harm to both women and men. For example, Christine starts her *The City of Ladies* with a personal account of how misogyny and slander affected her own capacities for self-knowledge. In *The God of Love's Letter*, on the other hand, Christine looks at how men develop toxic patterns of thinking and behaviour when they socialize by slandering women in taverns. I further argue that the kinds of epistemic and moral harm that Christine identifies in her discussion of misogyny and slander are relevant for how men and women can be virtuous agents.

West, Peter (Durham University, UK)

Stebbing's Pelicans: Public Philosophy in *Thinking to Some Purpose* and *Philosophy and the Physicists*

In this paper, I compare *Philosophy and the Physicists* and *Thinking to Some Purpose* in order to discern what they can tell us about Susan Stebbing's approach to writing philosophy for a popular audience. The question of how philosophers can, and why they should, engage in public philosophy is very much a live question today and, I will argue, an analysis of Stebbing's approach can inform that debate.

On the surface, *Philosophy and the Physicists* and *Thinking to Some Purpose* are very different texts, which presents a prima facie challenge to thinking of them both as part of the same project. The former is a critique of the popular scientific writings of James Jeans and Arthur Eddington; two of the foremost popularisers of science in Britain in the first half of the twentieth century. The subject matter, predominantly, is the latest developments in physics (such as Einstein's theories of relativity and quantum mechanics), the question of how best to communicate these developments to a non-specialist audience, and what (if any) philosophical conclusions can be drawn from them. *Thinking to Some Purpose*, meanwhile, is described on the cover of the original 1939 Pelican edition as "a manual to clear thinking, showing how to detect illogicalities in other peoples' mental processes and how to avoid them in our own". Stebbing begins *Thinking to Some Purpose* with an analysis of political speeches (especially those of the former Conservative Prime Minister, Stanley Baldwin) and includes further analysis of speeches, newspaper articles, and advertisements. Stebbing's aim here is to show how we can detect fallacies in language used in the world around us every day – and the importance of doing so.

While there are seemingly different issues at stake in each text, I will show that they are part of a unified project: that of ensuring that the citizens of a democracy are in a position to think clearly.

Stebbing's overarching aim, in other words, is to ensure that each individual knows how to think clearly and is not restricted from doing so by bad mental habits or misuses of language

Simon Wimmer (TU Dortmund, Germany)

Astell on thinking matter and natural immortality

In *The Christian Religion* (1717), Mary Astell attacks Locke's claim that we cannot discover whether an omnipotent being has "not given to some Systems of Matter fitly disposed, a power to perceive and think" (Locke, 1975, IV.iii.6). My main aim is to reconstruct an argument Astell gives in support of her attack that has remained undiscussed in the secondary literature so far (cf. Squadrito, 1987; Taylor, 2001; Broad, 2015). This argument is found in §§226-7 of *The Christian Religion* and turns on the distinction between natural and arbitrary (or positive) immortality: whereas an entity is naturally immortal just in case its immortality is a consequence of its nature, an entity is arbitrarily immortal just in case its immortality does not follow from its nature (but instead from God's will, say). As I reconstruct it, Astell's argument against Locke turns on two premises: (i) anything divisible is at most arbitrarily immortal, since its nature is consistent with its being divided and thereby destroyed; (ii) Locke's claim has the consequence that we cannot rule out that the soul is a divisible system of matter. Given these two premises, Locke's claim commits him to saying that we cannot rule out that the soul is only arbitrarily immortal. Astell, however, finds this commitment objectionable on theological grounds: it "leaves us no way to prove our Immortality, to those who don't admit the Authority of the Holy Scripture" (§226). Interestingly, Astell's appeal to natural immortality also enables her to argue for the immateriality of the soul, since she holds that any naturally immortal thing is either an indivisible "particle of body" (§227), which even by Locke's standards would arguably not be fitly disposed to possess a power to think, or an immaterial substance.

Yonover, Jason (John Hopkins University, USA)

Günderrode on Nature, Freedom, and Death

Although we are finally starting to see especially philosophical scholarship on Günderrode, also in English (Ezekiel 2020, Nassar forthcoming, Ng forthcoming), much work remains to be done—particularly in recognizing the *systematic* nature of Günderrode's thinking, i.e., the interconnectedness of several areas of her philosophical thought. In this paper I build on recent research in clarifying the relation between her philosophy of nature and her resulting, related accounts of freedom as self-expression and of death.

According to Günderrode, as I explain in the first section of the paper, the world is one in nature. Ephemeral individuation within this unity takes places as the "elements" of an all-encompassing

nature come together or are pulled apart, and in a *necessary* manner. Although there is debate on this point in the literature, I emphasize that Günderrode not only deploys necessitarian thinking to literary ends—as in *Muhammad, Prophet of Mecca* where Muhammad repeatedly denies his power to choose and instead highlights “the providence of God,” or as in *Hildgund* where the eponymous character stresses her “destiny”—but likewise in her shorter prose writings, for instance her notes on Fichte. Günderrode’s notion of *freedom* follows directly from her necessitarian account of nature, as I demonstrate on the basis of a close reading of *Hildgund* in the second section of the paper. In this literary text, Günderrode presents us with the possibility that we can be subject to “what superior power commands” in a manner that is aligned with our mission, and find liberation in that—strongly echoing Spinoza’s notion of freedom clarified in Definition Seven of Part I of the *Ethics*, following which freedom is existing according to the necessity of one’s nature. Upon hearing of Attila’s threats, Hildgund quickly allows that she must obey his command and wed him. But we soon find out that Hildgund plans to murder Attila the night she arrives to his kingdom, amid the celebrations of her ‘decision’ to ‘accept’ his marriage proposal. Hildgund thus affirms that she “will free [the people], free me” precisely by accepting her fate—i.e. by traveling to Attila’s kingdom, though to assassinate him.

Most interestingly and provocatively, as I show in the third and final section of the paper, Günderrode does not think on these bases that freedom for us requires that we live, as one might expect given her expressivist account of freedom (or given her naturalistic tendencies, which would rule out self-expression in a supernatural afterlife, but which will in fact pull her in the very opposite direction: to see possible freedom in death). On the reading I propose, Hildgund’s life ends following the planned assassination, which should be understood as a fatal albeit self-determined mission, i.e., as an *affirmative suicide*. I show that this possibility of a necessary transition from life to death, and yet via joy and ultimately liberation, indicates a departure from any orthodox Spinozistic tradition, and can be understood in dialogue with Herder and then-contemporary *Naturphilosophie*. Where for the fellow monist and naturalist Spinoza ‘suicide’ is really being overcome by other things contrary to one’s nature, Günderrode argues through “Hildgund and other texts that death can be perfectly in line with one’s nature and self-determined, indeed to such a degree that it could be liberating for the individual and even empowering for the world at large, as one’s “elements” return to it with more vital force than they previously had.

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