BEGIN:VCALENDAR
VERSION:2.0
PRODID:-//History of Women Philosophers and Scientists - ECPv6.15.18//NONSGML v1.0//EN
CALSCALE:GREGORIAN
METHOD:PUBLISH
X-WR-CALNAME:History of Women Philosophers and Scientists
X-ORIGINAL-URL:https://historyofwomenphilosophers.org
X-WR-CALDESC:Events for History of Women Philosophers and Scientists
REFRESH-INTERVAL;VALUE=DURATION:PT1H
X-Robots-Tag:noindex
X-PUBLISHED-TTL:PT1H
BEGIN:VTIMEZONE
TZID:Europe/Berlin
BEGIN:DAYLIGHT
TZOFFSETFROM:+0100
TZOFFSETTO:+0200
TZNAME:CEST
DTSTART:20240331T010000
END:DAYLIGHT
BEGIN:STANDARD
TZOFFSETFROM:+0200
TZOFFSETTO:+0100
TZNAME:CET
DTSTART:20241027T010000
END:STANDARD
BEGIN:DAYLIGHT
TZOFFSETFROM:+0100
TZOFFSETTO:+0200
TZNAME:CEST
DTSTART:20250330T010000
END:DAYLIGHT
BEGIN:STANDARD
TZOFFSETFROM:+0200
TZOFFSETTO:+0100
TZNAME:CET
DTSTART:20251026T010000
END:STANDARD
BEGIN:DAYLIGHT
TZOFFSETFROM:+0100
TZOFFSETTO:+0200
TZNAME:CEST
DTSTART:20260329T010000
END:DAYLIGHT
BEGIN:STANDARD
TZOFFSETFROM:+0200
TZOFFSETTO:+0100
TZNAME:CET
DTSTART:20261025T010000
END:STANDARD
END:VTIMEZONE
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Berlin:20250203T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Berlin:20250203T180000
DTSTAMP:20260409T013502
CREATED:20241017T112226Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20241029T102513Z
UID:29743-1738598400-1738605600@historyofwomenphilosophers.org
SUMMARY:Research Colloquium - Inken Schmidt-Voges & Sina Menke
DESCRIPTION:Prof. Dr. Inken Schmidt-Voges (Universität Marburg) and Sina Menke will present their Research. More information coming soon.
URL:https://historyofwomenphilosophers.org/event/research-colloquium-inken-schmidt-voges-sina-menke/
LOCATION:Technologiepark 21\, Universität Paderborn\, 33100\, Germany
CATEGORIES:Colloquium,Talk
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Berlin:20250205T163000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Berlin:20250205T180000
DTSTAMP:20260409T013502
CREATED:20241118T102509Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20241118T102700Z
UID:29908-1738773000-1738778400@historyofwomenphilosophers.org
SUMMARY:New Voices Winter 2025: Women in the History of Analytic Philosophy and Philosophy of Science
DESCRIPTION:Dr. Giulia Felappi\, (University of Southampton): “There is no reason for the necessity of the ultimate principles of deduction.” Margaret MacDonald on Logical Necessity. \nThis talks aims at contributing to the recent enterprise of rediscovering Margaret MacDonald’s views\, by focusing on her reflections on the necessity of logic\, a theme that runs through many of her papers and reviews. As it has been noted\, MacDonald was profoundly influenced by Peirce\, the Vienna Circle’s positivists\, Stebbing and Wittgenstein\, in particular the one of the lectures he delivered in the mid 1930s in Cambridge. Those authors surely form the background against which she developed her own views on the necessity of logic. But in this paper we will not aim at discussing her claims to detect those influences. Rather\, we will focus on MacDonald’s claims themselves\, and the reasons she put forward to support them. We will see both MacDonald’s negative views about what the necessity of logic is not (§1)\, and her positive view about what it is and how it supports her claim that it is in fact irrational to ask for a reason for the necessity of logic (§2). We will conclude by considering what she would reply now to defenders of dialethism and paraconsistent logics\, to better show how her view on the necessity of logic is different from others\, such as David Lewis’s (§3).
URL:https://historyofwomenphilosophers.org/event/new-voices-winter-2025-women-in-the-history-of-analytic-philosophy-and-philosophy-of-science/
CATEGORIES:Talk
ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/png:https://historyofwomenphilosophers.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/02/202101_NewVoices-02b.png
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Berlin:20250212T163000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Berlin:20250212T180000
DTSTAMP:20260409T013502
CREATED:20241118T103628Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20241118T104709Z
UID:29916-1739377800-1739383200@historyofwomenphilosophers.org
SUMMARY:New Voices Winter 2025: Women in the History of Analytic Philosophy and Philosophy of Science
DESCRIPTION:Dr. Suki Finn (Royal Holloway University of London): Thinking (About Stebbing) To Some (Feminist) Purpose \nSusan Stebbing’s popular book\, Thinking To Some Purpose\, was first published in 1939\, went out of print for many decades\, and was finally republished in 2022. The relevance of and need for the book is as pertinent now as it was when it was written. This paper outlines its applicability to the contemporary political setting and positions it as a feminist text. As such\, I think about Stebbing to some purpose\, namely\, some feminist purpose\, and argue that this gives purpose to Thinking To Some Purpose in present times. Gillian Russell (2024) has deemed Thinking To Some Purpose to be feminist insofar as it can be utilised to serve feminist ends; Sophia M. Connell and Frederique Janssen-Lauret (2023) take Stebbing’s work to exemplify and promote epistemic virtues that one could take to be feminist; Bryan Pickel (2022) highlights Stebbing’s holistic view of thought that incorporates a persons social situation\, which is reminiscent of feminist epistemology. I agree on all of these accounts and find further evidence to paint a feminist picture of Stebbing\, arguing for the rightful place of Thinking To Some Purpose as a crucial book for and of feminism\, inside and outside of academic philosophy. \n 
URL:https://historyofwomenphilosophers.org/event/new-voices-winter-2025-women-in-the-history-of-analytic-philosophy-and-philosophy-of-science-3/
CATEGORIES:Talk
ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/png:https://historyofwomenphilosophers.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/202101_NewVoices-03-e1614625925874.png
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Berlin:20250219T163000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Berlin:20250219T180000
DTSTAMP:20260409T013502
CREATED:20241118T105003Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20241125T140456Z
UID:29926-1739982600-1739988000@historyofwomenphilosophers.org
SUMMARY:New Voices Winter 2025: Women in the History of Analytic Philosophy and Philosophy of Science
DESCRIPTION:Dr. Julia Franke-Reddig (University of Siegen and Université de Genève): Ilse (Rosenthal-)Schneider and Einstein on Kantian Philosophy \nThe name Ilse (Rosenthal-)Schneider is not well known today. However\, she was a promising student of Albert Einstein\, Max von Laue\, and Alois Riehl\, publishing her dissertation on the space-time problem in the context of Kant and Einstein with Springer in 1921. Although prominent philosophers like Moritz Schlick and Hans Reichenbach harshly criticized her interpretation of the relationship between transcendental philosophy and the theory of relativity\, Einstein himself supported Schneider’s work\, even after her exile to Australia in 1938. \nIn Australia\, she never obtained a professorship but remained actively engaged in research and university life. Notably\, she later became a key figure in the foundation of Australian philosophy of science. Systematically\, Schneider advocated for a Neo-Kantian view\, arguing that transcendental philosophy was compatible with the general theory of relativity. While I do not aim to determine whether her interpretation was correct\, it is worth noting that Einstein—though not a philosopher and unfamiliar with Kantian philosophy—has often been associated with philosophical interpretations of relativity theory\, particularly by thinkers who reject a transcendental perspective. \nAs Klaus Hentschel pointed out\, Einstein evolved from being a conventionalist in 1917 to adopting a philosophical realist stance in later years. This evolution makes Schneider’s perspective on the philosophical interpretation of relativity theory particularly intriguing. She maintained close correspondence and professional exchange with Einstein until the end of his life. \nIn my talk\, I will reconstruct Schneider’s position on the relationship between Kantian philosophy and relativity theory and compare it to Einstein’s comments on the subject. This analysis aims to propose an approach or an initial framework for a better understanding Einstein’s position regarding the philosophical implications of his theory.
URL:https://historyofwomenphilosophers.org/event/new-voices-winter-2025-women-in-the-history-of-analytic-philosophy-and-philosophy-of-science-4/
CATEGORIES:Talk
ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/png:https://historyofwomenphilosophers.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/202101_NewVoices-03-e1614625925874.png
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Berlin:20250226T163000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Berlin:20250226T180000
DTSTAMP:20260409T013502
CREATED:20241118T105355Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20241118T105400Z
UID:29929-1740587400-1740592800@historyofwomenphilosophers.org
SUMMARY:New Voices Winter 2025: Women in the History of Analytic Philosophy and Philosophy of Science
DESCRIPTION:Dr. Amanda J. Favia (Nassau Community College): What’s Self-love Got to Do with it? E.E. Constance Jones on the Deduction of Prudence from Benevolence \nE. E. (Emily Elizabeth) Constance Jones (1848-1922) was a prominent figure in British philosophy in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries known primarily for her work in philosophical logic. Jones\, however\, also made important contributions to ethics and moral psychology. This talk will focus on one of those contributions—Jones’s response to Sidgwick’s “dualism of practical reason”\, a problem that Sidgwick never resolved to his own satisfaction. Sidgwick held that practical reason has an allegiance to two distinct ‘methods’: self-love (prudence) and benevolence (duty to others). While both methods are independently rational\, they may potentially come into conflict. This\, for Jones\, presented “the most important difficulty of the system of [Sidgwick’s] Universalistic Hedonism”. As such\, she returned to this problem a number of times in the course of her career producing several original and promising responses. In two of her most promising responses—what I will call the Argument from Temporal Irrelevance and the Argument from Mutual Dependency—Jones attempts to demonstrate a necessary connection between self-love and benevolence that subverts the problematic dualism. Ultimately\, there is no actual conflict of methods\, only an appearance of one. After a close analysis of these two arguments\, I will consider some challenges to her view and argue that even if her arguments are not entirely successful in resolving the “dualism of practical reason”\, they succeed in changing the course of the debate.
URL:https://historyofwomenphilosophers.org/event/new-voices-winter-2025-women-in-the-history-of-analytic-philosophy-and-philosophy-of-science-5/
CATEGORIES:Talk
ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/png:https://historyofwomenphilosophers.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/202101_NewVoices-03-e1614625925874.png
END:VEVENT
END:VCALENDAR